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And every time that's successful, it's because some idiot admin wasn't |
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filtering their incoming BGP traffic properly. Ditto the network in Florida |
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which acted as a black hole for the entire Internet in the late 90s. |
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|
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Proper training and filtering helps prevent these kinds of issues. It's |
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happened, sure. And it will happen again. And it will be recovered from |
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again. Policies will be adapted, trained and forgotten, again. |
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|
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ZZ |
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On Feb 18, 2012 1:15 PM, "Pandu Poluan" <pandu@××××××.info> wrote: |
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|
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> On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 21:36, Alan McKinnon <alan.mckinnon@×××××.com> |
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> wrote: |
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> > On Sat, 18 Feb 2012 06:00:00 -0600 |
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> > Dale <rdalek1967@×××××.com> wrote: |
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> > |
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> >> > And no, the intartubes will NOT be switched off. |
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> >> > |
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> >> |
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> >> I don't really think they can unless they just cut power to all the |
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> >> computers. After all, the internet is supposed to be redundant right? |
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> >> If there is a few computers still running that have a connection, it |
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> >> is still working. Sort of anyway. |
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> >> |
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> >> Does make one wonder tho. They have been talking about having a |
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> >> internet "off switch" but I'm not sure it would be that easy. |
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> > |
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> > To switch off the internet, you don't switch off the computers on the |
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> > internet. You switch off the routers that drive the internet. |
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> > |
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> |
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> You don't need to turn off the routers. |
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> |
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> Just inject BGP poison. |
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> |
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> I just re-found the news: |
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> |
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> |
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> http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9197019/Update_Report_sounds_alarm_on_China_s_rerouting_of_U.S._Internet_traffic |
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> |
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> The article I linked above contains 2 incidents: |
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> |
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> The first incident rerouted traffic for a huge swath of Internet, |
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> including traffic destined to Microsoft, the Office of the USA SecDef, |
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> and others. |
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> |
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> The second incident blocked traffic for some sites, notably Twitter, |
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> Yahoo, and Facebook. |
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> |
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> BOTH incidents happened because of BGP poisoning. BOTH incidents |
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> affected traffic FROM the USA to destinations IN the USA even though |
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> the poisoning happened from OUTSIDE of the USA. |
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> |
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> The country where both incidents happened (in these cases, China) is |
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> not essential. ANY country with a BGP router connected to the backbone |
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> can easily poison other international backbone routers. Especially if |
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> said country has a HUGE International bandwidth. |
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> |
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> Rgds, |
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> -- |
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> FdS Pandu E Poluan |
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> ~ IT Optimizer ~ |
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> |
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> • LOPSA Member #15248 |
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> • Blog : http://pepoluan.tumblr.com |
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> • Linked-In : http://id.linkedin.com/in/pepoluan |
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> |
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> |
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