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On Monday, June 02, 2014 03:23:03 PM Matti Nykyri wrote: |
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> On Jun 2, 2014, at 16:40, "J. Roeleveld" <joost@××××××××.org> wrote: |
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> > On Monday, June 02, 2014 07:28:53 AM Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Neil Bothwick <neil@××××××××××.uk> wrote: |
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> >>> On Mon, 02 Jun 2014 05:27:44 -0500, Dale wrote: |
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> >>>> The second option does sound what I am looking for. Basically, if I |
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> >>>> log |
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> >>>> out but leave my computer on, leave home, some crook/NSA type breaks in |
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> >>>> and tries to access something or steals my whole puter, they would just |
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> >>>> get garbage for data. That seems to fit the second option best. |
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> >>> |
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> >>> If they steal your computer they will have to power it off, unless you |
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> >>> are kind enough to leave them a large enough UPS to steal along with it, |
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> >>> so any encryption will be equally effective. |
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> >> |
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> >> If you're worried about casual thieves then just about any kind of |
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> >> properly-implemented encryption will stop them. |
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> >> |
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> >> If you're worried about a government official specifically tasked with |
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> >> retrieving your computer, my understanding is that it is SOP these |
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> >> days to retrieve your computer without powering it off for just this |
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> >> reason. They won't use your UPS to do it. Typically they remove the |
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> >> plug just far enough to expose the prongs, slide in a connector that |
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> >> connects it to a UPS, and then they pull it out the rest of the way |
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> >> now powered by the UPS. |
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> >> |
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> >> See something like: |
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> >> http://www.cru-inc.com/products/wiebetech/hotplug_field_kit/ |
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> > |
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> > Hmm... Those are nice, but can be easily built yourself with an |
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> > off-the-shelf UPS. |
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> > |
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> >> Presumably somebody who is determined will also have the means to |
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> >> retrieve the contents of RAM once they seize your computer. Besides |
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> >> directlly accessing the memory bus I think most motherboards are not |
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> >> designed to be secure against attacks from PCI/firewire/etc. |
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> > |
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> > Hmm... add something to auto-shutdown the computer when a hotplug event |
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> > occurs on any of the internal ports and remove support for unused ports |
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> > from the kernel. |
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> > |
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> > I wonder how they'd keep a computer from initiating a shutdown procedure |
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> > or |
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> > causing a kernel panic when it looses (wireless) connection to another |
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> > device that is unlikely to be moved when powered up? |
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> |
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> Well i have a switch in the door of the server room. It opens when you open |
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> the door. That signals the kernel to wipe all the encryption keys from |
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> kernel memory. Without the keys there is no access to the disks. After that |
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> another kernel is executed which wipes the memory of the old kernel. If you |
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> just pull the plug memory will stay in its state for an unspecified time. |
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|
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You don't happen to have a howto on how to set that up? |
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|
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> Swap uses random keys. |
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> |
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> network switches and routers get power only after firewall-server is up and |
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> running. |
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|
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networked powersockets? |
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|
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> There is no easy way to enter the room without wipeing the encryption keys. |
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> Booting up the server requires that a boot disk is brought to the computer |
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> to decrypt the boot drive. Grub2 can do this easily. This is to prevent |
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> some one to tamper eith a boot loader. |
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> |
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> System is not protected against hardware tamperment. The server room is an |
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> RF-cage. |
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> |
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> I consoder this setup quite secure. |
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|
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Makes me wonder what it is you are protecting your server from. :) |
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-- |
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Joost |