| 1 |
On Tuesday 2010-05-18 18:56, Stefan G. Weichinger wrote: |
| 2 |
> |
| 3 |
>>> Do you know any howto where it is done "the right way"? |
| 4 |
>> |
| 5 |
>> The right and easy way is to just use the supplied pmt-ehd(8) tool, |
| 6 |
>> which works both interactively and non-interactively, depending on |
| 7 |
>> whether it's called with enough arguments or not, so there's something |
| 8 |
>> for everybody's flavor. |
| 9 |
>> It does not do LUKS yet as of pam_mount 2.2, though. Guess my |
| 10 |
>> todo list gets longer.. |
| 11 |
> |
| 12 |
>:-) |
| 13 |
> |
| 14 |
>But given the fact that I store the key on the same hard-disk with the |
| 15 |
>shadowed user-pw I could also leave that openssl-part straight away, |
| 16 |
>correct?? seems the same level of (in)security to me ... |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
Yes. The point of keyfiles is to be able to change the password on |
| 19 |
a volume. |
| 20 |
|
| 21 |
Without a keyfile, a crypto program would take the password, hash it |
| 22 |
somehow, and you get your AES key. Changing the password means having |
| 23 |
a different AES key, meaning decrypting the disk will yield a |
| 24 |
different result. In other words, changing the password would require |
| 25 |
at least reading the old data, reencrypting it and writing it again. |
| 26 |
Takes time. |
| 27 |
|
| 28 |
With a keyfile, you retain the same AES key all the time, and encrypt |
| 29 |
the AES key itself - reencrypting the AES key is quick, as it's |
| 30 |
only some xyz bits, not terabytes. |
Archives