Re: [gentoo-user] apache2 AddHandler/SetHandler vulnerability

[Michael Orlitzky]

On 04/26/2015 04:04 AM, Mick wrote:
>
> Hmm ... I am probably affected by this change too.  Running find for '*.php.*'
> et al, comes up with a tonne of files like this:
>
> /var/www/My_Website_Name/htdocs/modules/simpletest/tests/upgrade/drupal-7.filled.minimal.database.php.gz
>
> If I were to manually install protection, as suggested in the news item, where
> should I be doing this?  In (umpteen) .htaccess files for each vhost, or
> somewhere in /etc/apache2/*
>

That's only a problem if those php.gz files can be uploaded by an
untrusted user (and you want to stop them).

That's a Drupal site, right? If you allow anonymous users to create
accounts and upload files, then I could create an "mjo" account on your
site and upload exploit.php.html to sites/default/files/mjo. Then I
could visit,

  http://example.org/sites/default/files/mjo/exploit.php.html

and it would run the script with the permissions of your web server. So,
it could probably read the database password out of
sites/default/settings.php.

The half-assed way to prevent that is to block uploads of *.php files,
but the point of the vulnerability is that not only PHP files will be
executed. A better way is to disable the PHP engine entirely on any user
upload directories. There was actually a Drupal CVE for that:

  https://www.drupal.org/SA-CORE-2013-003

And yeah, you should do that on every user-upload directory for every
website you have. It sucks but you can use mod_macro if you have more
than one e.g. Drupal site. I've got this in our Drupal macro:

  <Directory "/var/www/$domain/$host/public/sites/*/files">
    # Deny access to user-uploaded PHP files.
    <Files "*.php">
      Require all denied
    </Files>
  </Directory>

But maybe it's safer to use,

  <Directory "/var/www/$domain/$host/public/sites/*/files">
    <Files "*">
      php_flag engine off
    </Files>
  </Directory>