Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: Michael Mol <mikemol@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-user@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] {OT} Are "push" backups flawed?
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 18:34:58
Message-Id: CA+czFiCJxvFur6Qf7w5uDwZ2Q0B5y-h9UbO340qUtibZCP0W7g@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-user] {OT} Are "push" backups flawed? by Grant
1 On Fri, Nov 11, 2011 at 1:27 PM, Grant <emailgrant@×××××.com> wrote:
2 >> [snip]
3 >>
4 >>> The problem with my current push-style layout is that if one of the 3
5 >>> machines is compromised, the attacker can delete or alter the backup
6 >>> of the compromised machine on the backup server.  I can rsync the
7 >>> backups from the backup server to another machine, but if the backups
8 >>> are deleted or altered on the backup server, the rsync'ed copy on the
9 >>> next machine will also be deleted or altered.
10 >>
11 >> As a final stage in your backup, could you trigger a 'pull'-style
12 >> backup copying the data image to a more secure area? How about setting
13 >
14 > Even if I pull a copy of the backup to a separate machine from the
15 > backup server, it will pull an altered copy if an attacker compromises
16 > one of the systems being backed up and alters that system's backup on
17 > the backup server.  Am I missing something?
18
19 If you're not applying any kind of versioning, it doesn't matter if
20 you're pushing or pulling; your backup will eventually be overwritten
21 by a backup of a hacked system unless you catch and respond as soon as
22 the original invasion happens. So it sounds like the scenario you fear
23 isn't tied to the mechanism you're reconsidering.
24
25 --
26 :wq