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On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 11:41:17PM +0200, hasufell wrote: |
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> On 06/19/2013 10:43 PM, Petteri R￤ty wrote: |
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> > On 19.6.2013 23.18, hasufell wrote: |
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> >> What is a possible solution? Let the council elect all members. |
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> >> That way the power still comes from the dev community, although |
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> >> they do not vote devrel directly. The council should vote |
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> >> anonymously, so that no connection between council member and |
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> >> elected devrel member can be drawn which could otherwise affect |
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> >> the election of the council. This system should prevent people |
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> >> from thinking two steps ahead when voting the council. |
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> >> |
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> > |
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> > The council can already do that if they so choose. Granted if this |
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> > process was made explicit it could have some influence on the |
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> > turnover. In practice so far oversight has not been a problem |
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> > (though since for quite a few years I have been part of both bodies |
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> > the two have been quite connected). |
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> > |
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> |
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> If they choose... that means the current form of control over devrel |
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> is only of a _reactive_ nature. That nature is also necessary, but |
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> that is not how "control" is defined in the context I was explaining |
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> in the first post. |
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> |
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> What happens if power has been abused and damage is already done? The |
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> council can just pick up the pieces then, revert decisions (if |
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> possible) and try to deescalate. |
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> Then people will ask... who is responsible? Why was there no explicit |
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> election? |
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> That might even lead to devrel losing respect. People will think they |
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> just have that power because they came first. |
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> It's not just about saying retroactively that someone wasn't fit for |
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> devrel after he messed up, it's about saying who IS fit. Then people |
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> know why that person got that kind of authority. |
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who is "fit" is always going to be subjective. is it just someone who |
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has been in gentoo for a while? is it someone who has had professional |
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experience in conflict resolution e.g. a manager? |
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You aren't going to be able to detect who might abuse power until after |
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it is done, so I don't really see a way to guarantee that a scenario |
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like that will never happen. |
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> Also... we still don't have any rotation, except when devs resign from |
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> that project. |
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|
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Rotation is another issue entirely. Do we want forced rotation? Do we |
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want to force people to resign from devrel after x amount of time? |
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> Another thing: what do we do if devrel blocks actions against it's own |
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> members? Because that's what gentoo projects have partly evolved |
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> into... a group of buddies. I don't have much of a problem with that |
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> in general, as it can improve effectivenes from some standpoints, but |
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> this is not about a regular project. |
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The council can override anything devrel does, including forcing |
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someone off of devrel if they think that person has gotten out of line, |
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so I don't see a problem here. |
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> I don't even claim that current devrel is not fit or that they just |
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> form their group of buddies, but why should we not try to minimize |
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> those possibilities? |
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> |
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> If we want them to use the sledgehammer, it should be clear who gets |
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> that sledgehammer and why. Make it explicit, rule out uncertainties. |
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> Rotate that role, so people don't lose focus. |
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That is done, the lead gets to use the sledgehammer under certain |
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circumstances [1], and the lead is selected by the project members |
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yearly under glep 39 just like any project. |
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|
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William |
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[1] http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/devrel/policy.xml |
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