Gentoo Archives: gentoo-catalyst

From: Erick M <balkira@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-catalyst@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-catalyst] Encrypted livecd's - need testers
Date: Sun, 01 Jul 2007 15:15:24
Message-Id: e47df0b0707010814m1940a41cjc590dbe311c068b@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-catalyst] Encrypted livecd's - need testers by Nelson Batalha
1 I do not mean to undertake your idea, but I got this simple question that
2 your design does not solve:
3
4 What's next when you get caught?
5
6 The whole point of your system is protection of data for the user if the CD
7 falls into other hands. But the legal context nowadays requires you to give
8 the key.
9
10 - With your system on my livecd, legally I can get in Europe 2 years and a
11 huge fine if I keep my password secret, hence I will handle the key to get
12 something under those 2 years, and every one would do so even you, I guess.
13 Your design is like writing on that CD that it is encrypted: the first guy
14 who boots it finds out that you have something to hide!
15
16 So at the end, the whole design of such system falls into pieces. I mean,
17 it's alright for the university, your friends but it is simply not enough
18 against legal constraints which is my main concern, let's face the worst
19 enemy, cryptography simply fails to protect valuable information because of
20 yourself: be realistic, will you just keep your mouth shut when that legal
21 voice will trade:"give us the password or it's 2 years!"?
22
23 - With my system on my livecd, the overall clear side is part of the stealth
24 concept, keep it as usual as you can from the outside, the less change the
25 better. Then I just copy my binary to something irrelevant into /usr/bin and
26 my container file somewhere in /usr/lib and here we go. From a forensic
27 perspective analysis it is much more difficult to reveal the encrypted
28 material. You got in the first place to actually find the encrypted
29 material(few bytes over a Gigabytes). How can charges be pressed without
30 evidence? Then when evidence is found as a file, you have several containers
31 to fall back to. You give a first and single password away that will decrypt
32 a different part than the one you are protecting.
33
34 Finally, the comparison with true-crypt is unfair (for true-crypt) because
35 it can handle up to 2 containers inside of each other, as denyfs goes up to
36 16 containers, along with 16 != passwords . It's programmed so, but again
37 the setup has to take that 15% data ratio in account or you will start
38 messing with statistic which is your worst enemy. Truecrypt does not deal
39 with this issue and will never, because math cannot solve this problem. The
40 probability of collision increase exponentially with the number of
41 containers along with the size of the main container. And yes denyfs one so
42 often breaks, by overwriting some bits here or there, let's say 1/10 but
43 this is the reason why it makes it so powerful and no reversible. At the end
44 it is a human choice, the user defines a trade between the size of his main
45 container and the number of sub containers he will create to fit the
46 specific amount of data that needs hiding. And this is the missing parameter
47 in the problem, hence the reason no such perfect system will ever be
48 implemented.
49
50 If you have containers A and B that do not know their respective
51 existences, how can you ensure they won't overwrite bit of one another? You
52 simply can't! You fall into statistics and the only choice to optimize
53 integrity is to up size a huge main container and work on say 5% max of the
54 whole size. Add to that, that 5% rate needs to be lower each time as you
55 create sub containers.
56
57 Cryptography is an open door to investigation, the first question is:"wtf
58 does he want to hide?"
59 If you can evade this reflexion in your "opponent" mind then it is then very
60 highly probable that the material that needs to be hidden will stay hidden!
61
62 That's the key concept of military data flow over enemy lines (sounds heavy
63 but true) nowadays in military IT mainly inspired by an Oxford professor
64 (the one who wrote the first public implementation forked on ext2 called
65 StegFS, he's easy to find). The point is to evade torture (physical and
66 psychological) of messengers when they get caught with encrypted data.
67
68 anyway I made my point that the "best" technology for such job exists and is
69 available and it does *not* apply your design but something much more
70 subtle.
71
72 Good work for your stuff, it's good for countries which do not have yet IT
73 laws like the one mentioned, Africa, South America (except Brazil) and I'm
74 sure a couple of penguins in the North pole but for European and US
75 citizens, this kind of protection has no legal dimension, and will fall into
76 piece in a real governmental situation.
77
78 I'm looking forward to a merge into the official catalyst project.
79
80 Thanks for reading.
81
82
83
84
85
86 On 7/1/07, Nelson Batalha <nelson_batalha@××××.pt> wrote:
87 >
88 > I would like to quote these two statements:
89 >
90 > http://gentoo-wiki.com/SECURITY_System_Encryption_DM-Crypt_with_LUKS#Two_things_to_remember
91 >
92 > Thanks for your help, but:
93 >
94 > > It does not protect more the user while he uses it nor from
95 > > potential "after-use" trails.
96 >
97 > So? Was I supposed to release a complete secure solution right now? :P
98 >
99 > > Either you lose the livecd
100 > > along with your identity (or data that leads to your identity) and
101 > > you get caught or while using the software you get caught (like
102 > > your TOR connections have been detected). The only purpose and
103 > > advantage encryption would have is to
104 > > obfuscate some passwords like in the firefox example you gave.
105 >
106 > The idea is that with this livecd you're on the move, boot the cd, use
107 > tor and go away asap once finished. Make sure all your sensible data
108 > is sent in a package just before leaving. If you lose it or someone
109 > looks at it, it won't suspect much.
110 >
111 > > The real solution to your problem would be to use a steganographic
112 > > layer ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography[1] ) .
113 >
114 > It's not like I didn't remembered steganography, read below.
115 >
116 > > You will not find much (I mean actual real software) besides some
117 > > linux-2.2 tweak over ext2 "proof-of-concept" (10years old
118 > > not stable unreliable)
119 >
120 > False? Look for TrueCrypt.
121 >
122 > > I think that encryption has nothing to do with hiding. In the
123 > > contrary, it is like a big flag standing saying "hey look at
124 > > me I got something to hide, come and get me!". It is just
125 > > obfuscating technology.
126 >
127 > Using the crypt_silent option how likely are you of being catched?
128 > Just put some binaries of emacs and so on on the root, and demonstrate
129 > in the fake root that's what is for. It is a good hiding technique I
130 > think, but not perfect.
131 >
132 > The thing is, given the low probability of being catched, either by
133 > having the squashfs with Steganography or not, some large file would
134 > be there, and if they're good enough to realize it is a bootable
135 > livecd and it is forcing a fake boot, then they're good enough to see
136 > a big closed file is there.
137 >
138 > Unless one did multiple hidden volumes inside this one, or just hide
139 > some files inside the root. But we're back to less usability and we're
140 > being forced to use truecrypt (I don't see a currently free maintained
141 > option).
142 >
143 > If we accept the Truecrypt restrictions (haven't read everything, but
144 > it's not gpl so I assume they're more restrictive :P), we could
145 > implement these several layers of encryption and increase
146 > functionality with some scripts hidden in a pen for example. But to
147 > put any programs like firefox+torplugin+tor+privoxy in them, and
148 > separate in small files, that's a lot of work. This implementation is
149 > good enough for most cases. Also Luks is well maintained and GPL.
150 >
151 > > Now, from a legal point of view, being caught with an encrypted
152 > > material whether livecd or not in major countries
153 > > (UK,GER,FR,US,china) requires from you the decryption key
154 >
155 > Fine for me, don't do anything illegal in free countries. As for the
156 > China example, just do as on my second point and use the following
157 > idea: encrypt with luks as it is, and for the more sensitive files you
158 > can use stenography using stenography software in a separate volume
159 > (like a usb pen). If they ask you for the key, give it to them and
160 > show just some more innocent files you were hiding.
161 >
162 > It's better then have the cd almost all open, again, because you may lose
163 > it.
164 >
165 > Let me know if I'm wrong or if you have more ideas ;)
166 >
167 > Cheers,
168 > Nelson
169 > --
170 > gentoo-catalyst@g.o mailing list
171 >
172 >

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-catalyst] Encrypted livecd's - need testers Nelson Batalha <nelson_batalha@××××.pt>