Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Jean-Michel Smith <jean@××××.com>
To: Johannes Findeisen <you@×××××.org>, gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] possible trojan in openssh-3.4p1
Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2002 11:09:08
Message-Id: 200208031109.07227.jean@kcco.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] possible trojan in openssh-3.4p1 by Johannes Findeisen
1 On Friday 02 August 2002 02:36 am, Johannes Findeisen wrote:
2
3 > if this should be a option in portage, we always need to download two files
4 > from two servers to check if the md5sum are the same... :-(
5 > IMO it is good as it is. the gentoo-core team are providing a md5sum in the
6 > portage tree and that should be enough.
7
8 Until it isn't, which is going to happen, sooner or later.
9
10 Ideally each developer would GPG sign their source tarballs (and have their
11 public keys available from several independent locations, such as
12 key-servers, a public key-ring available for download, and purchase on CDR).
13
14 But at the very least, Gentoo should have a public keyring available (again,
15 from multiple sources to insure the keyring itself hasn't been modified), and
16 each ebuild and digest file should be cryptographically signed. Emerge
17 should check those signatures and validate them before installing an ebuild.
18
19 If this issue isn't addressed in some fashion, it really only becomes a
20 question of time before Gentoo is trojanned via the ebuild/emerge process,
21 and the entire distro gets a big black eye as a result, and then addresses
22 these concerns anyway.
23
24 Why not do it proactively instead?
25
26 Jean.

Replies

Subject Author
[gentoo-dev] Re: possible trojan in openssh-3.4p1 "A.Waschbuesch" <awaschb@××××.de>