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On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 12:49 AM, Gordon Pettey <petteyg359@×××××.com> |
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wrote: |
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|
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> On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 5:32 PM, Hanno Böck <hanno@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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>> On Thu, 19 Oct 2017 21:08:40 +0200 |
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>> Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: |
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>> |
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>> > manifest-hashes = SHA512 SHA3_512 |
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>> |
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>> Counterproposal: Just use SHA512. |
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>> |
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>> There isn't any evidence that any SHA2-based hash algorithm is going to |
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>> be broken any time soon. If that changes there will very likely be |
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>> decades of warning before a break becomes practical. |
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>> |
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>> Having just one hash is simpler and using a well supported one like |
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>> SHA512 may make things easier than using something that's still not |
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>> very widely supported. |
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> |
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> |
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> Yet having more than one lets you match make sure nobody hijacked your |
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> manifest file when an attack vector is inevitably discovered for the old |
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> new algorithm (whether SHA2, SHA3, or BLAKE2), because you'll be able to |
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> confirm the file is the same one that matched the old checksum in addition |
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> to the new one. |
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> |
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As Hanno was saying, we'll have decades of warning before a break becomes |
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practical, so I don't think this is a real concern. |
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I think the problem of having this discussion on gentoo-dev this way is |
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that people with vastly different levels of security/crypto expertise are |
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discussing different options without much regard for the level of expertise |
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(and maybe even unaware of others' relevant expertise). |
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I support Hanno's suggestion of doing just SHA512, but would be interested |
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in hearing opinions from others who have apparent security/crypto |
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experience. Maybe the Security project can weigh the suggestions as well? |
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Cheers, |
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|
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Dirkjan |
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