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>>>>> On Fri, 20 Oct 2017, Dirkjan Ochtman wrote: |
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> As Hanno was saying, we'll have decades of warning before a break |
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> becomes practical, so I don't think this is a real concern. |
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How can we be sure of that? I guess the same reasoning was applied |
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when MD5 and SHA1 hashes were used. |
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> I think the problem of having this discussion on gentoo-dev this way |
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> is that people with vastly different levels of security/crypto |
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> expertise are discussing different options without much regard for |
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> the level of expertise (and maybe even unaware of others' relevant |
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> expertise). |
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> I support Hanno's suggestion of doing just SHA512, but would be |
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> interested in hearing opinions from others who have apparent |
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> security/crypto experience. Maybe the Security project can weigh the |
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> suggestions as well? |
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Don't put all eggs in one basket. Having at least one additional hash |
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(and from a different family) doesn't cost us much and provides an |
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upgrade path when it should become necessary. |
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Ulrich |
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