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On 10/08/17 11:42, William L. Thomson Jr. wrote: |
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> On Thu, 10 Aug 2017 10:50:45 +1000 |
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> "Sam Jorna (wraeth)" <wraeth@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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>> On 10/08/17 06:35, William L. Thomson Jr. wrote: |
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>>> FYI binpkgs have no hash. If someone did something malicious within |
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>>> the binhost to the binpkgs. You have no way of knowing. Yes the |
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>>> same can happen with ebuilds and manifest. But easy to sync portage |
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>>> and see if a manifest has changed. |
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>> |
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>> This isn't exactly true - see ${PKGDIR}/Packages on the binhost, which |
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>> is a manifest of built packages and related metadata. Granted this is |
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>> created by the binhost, it does exist and contains SHA1 and MD5 |
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>> hashes, as well as package size. In that sense it's no different to |
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>> how a package Manifest file works within a repository. |
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> |
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> You are correct. I meant to say no verifiable hash. You can hash |
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> anything locally and claim it to be trustworthy. Thus mentioning |
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> syncing portage to compare manifest of ebuild/SRC_URI<snip> |
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> IMHO SRI_URI is more trustworthy than binhost, in the sense of |
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> verification. If you have means to verify the binhost stuff it maybe |
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> more trustworthy. That is left to the admin. |
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|
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This is no greater risk than syncing from a potentially compromised |
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mirror. You would use a mirror you trust and, similarly (perhaps even |
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more so) you would use a binhost you trust. |
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It does raise the idea of some form of signing of the Packages file, |
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similar to gpg-signed portage snapshots, but that's moving well beyond |
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the scope of this thread. |
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-- |
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Sam Jorna (wraeth) |
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GnuPG ID: D6180C26 |
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