Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Matthias Maier <tamiko@g.o>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Trustless Infrastructure
Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 17:23:42
Message-Id: 87muv9o8kq.fsf@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] Trustless Infrastructure by "Jason A. Donenfeld"
1 On Mon, Jul 2, 2018, at 12:01 CDT, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <zx2c4@g.o> wrote:
2
3 > Aren't git signatures done over the full commit objects? Meaning you'd
4 > need the entire tree of metadata and thus all commits in order to
5 > verify? Or do you see some clever opportunity for extracting just
6 > enough metadata that you could actually have a file-based, rather than
7 > commit-based, verification?
8
9
10 Git signatures are over the full commit object - and the commit contains
11 a hash of the root of the full repository tree. Git internally only
12 stores tree snapshots (and not differences). So all you need is exactly
13 one signed commit to verify that
14
15 - this is the full repository tree the developer saw at the time of the
16 commit
17
18 - this is the full history the developer saw at the time of the commit
19
20
21 Meaning, our current tree signing practice already ensures that
22
23 - history cannot be tampered with
24 - allows for a complete audit log
25
26 (in buzzspeak, we're doing blockchain verification *SCNR*)
27
28 Best,
29 Matthias

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] Trustless Infrastructure Rich Freeman <rich0@g.o>
Re: [gentoo-dev] Trustless Infrastructure "Jason A. Donenfeld" <zx2c4@g.o>