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W dniu pon, 02.07.2018 o godzinie 17∶36 +0200, użytkownik Jason A. |
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Donenfeld napisał: |
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> Hey guys, |
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> |
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> While our infrastructure team has some nice technical competence, the |
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> recent disaster and ongoing embarrassing aftermath has made ever more |
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> urgent the need to have end-to-end signatures between developers and |
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> users. While the infrastructure team seems fairly impressive at |
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> deploying services and keeping the house running smoothly, I'd rather |
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> we don't place additional burden on them to do everything they're |
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> doing securely. Specifically, I'd like to ensure that 100% of Gentoo's |
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> infrastructure can be hacked, yet not backdoor a single witting user |
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> of the portage tree. Right now, as it stands, rsync distributes |
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> signatures to users that are derived from some |
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> infrastructure-controlled keys, not from the developers themselves. |
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> |
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> Proposal: |
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> - Sign every file in the portage tree so that it has a corresponding |
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> .asc. Repoman will need support for this. |
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> - Ensure the naming scheme of portage files is sufficiently strict, so |
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> that renaming or re-parenting signed files doesn't result in RCE. [*] |
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> - Distribute said .asc files with rsync per usual. |
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> |
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|
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Another problem: how do you prevent attacks based on removing files? |
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For example, let's say a MITM that removes new version of some packages |
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and related GLSAs in order to force the user to stay at vulnerable |
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version. |
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|
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |
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