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[Sent from my iPad, as it is not a secured device there are no cryptographic keys on this device, meaning this message is sent without an OpenPGP signature. In general you should *not* rely on any information sent over such an unsecure channel, if you find any information controversial or un-expected send a response and request a signed confirmation] |
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> On 4 Apr 2017, at 12:10, Dirkjan Ochtman <djc@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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> On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 12:03 PM, Andreas K. Huettel |
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> <dilfridge@g.o> wrote: |
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>>> while we're discussing super-strength hash algos, it would be cool to know |
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>>> what's still missing for |
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>>> * rsync-side manifest signing in whatever way |
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>>> * verification of such signatures in portage / emerge |
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>>> |
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>> |
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>> (and just to put it in a reference frame, I'm these days reading mailing list |
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>> discussions how cryptographic signing of our rsync tree is urgently needed... |
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>> ... in the council agenda threads |
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>> ... of the very first council |
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>> ... i.e., 2005 |
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>> ... i.e., roughly 12 years ago.) |
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> |
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> Was thinking exactly the same thing yesterday. How do we make it |
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> happen? Do we have any ideas on feasible paths forward? |
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After having been through two GSoCs , the meta-manifest code is written, gkeys is in testing stage for key management etc |
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iirc (taken from memory, can include faulty info) waiting on (i) infra generation of key material on airgapped system with appropriate signing subkey to use for online server (ii) code to do signing on rsync staging area (which is mostly written) on aforementioned subkey (ii) testing of the aforementioned code before rollout |
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it is coordinated by Gentoo Keys project so questions should really be directed there (gkeys@) |
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