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On Sun, Sep 07, 2003 at 09:54:20PM +0000, Jan Krueger wrote: |
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> On Sunday 07 September 2003 21:43, Jan Krueger wrote: |
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> > No. I trust you. But trusting you doesnt mean that the ebuild you checked |
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> > in to the tree arrives at my hardrive unmodified. There is no way for you |
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> > as a human beeing to garantee this to me. Instead it should be expected |
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> > that the ebuild gets modified (by faulty software/hardware/network/whatever |
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> > or by a malicious attacker). So this must be taken care of. |
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> I give you an example: |
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> With so many gentoo-rsync hosts spread all over and the use of unencripted |
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> rsync transfer a man in the middle attack (eg. by arp-spoofing or whatever), |
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> that inserts an malicious ebuild along with digest and Manifest into the |
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> rsync stream is very much imaginable to me. |
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> |
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> So i suggest to, as quickly as possible, establish the infrastucture to do |
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> rsync over ssl/ssl or other secure transport. |
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> |
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GPG signing would take care of this issue. |
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-- |
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Jon Portnoy |
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avenj/irc.freenode.net |
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gentoo-dev@g.o mailing list |
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