Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: "Michał Górny" <mgorny@g.o>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Cc: security@g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] [RFC] Decoupling stabilization from security bugs
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2021 04:49:03
Message-Id: 0f2e81d5af2fddf804c10cad46dc9d9baeccfab6.camel@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] [RFC] Decoupling stabilization from security bugs by Matt Turner
1 On Thu, 2021-08-12 at 13:17 -0700, Matt Turner wrote:
2 > On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 5:53 AM Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote:
3 > >
4 > > Hello, everyone.
5 > >
6 > > TL;DR: I'd like to propose that stabilizations are done via blockers of
7 > > security bugs instead of security bugs themselves, i.e. as any other
8 > > stabilizations.
9 > >
10 > >
11 > > Right now we're often performing security-related stabilizations via
12 > > security bugs. This has a few problems, that are:
13 > >
14 > > 1. Stabilization-related activity causes unnecessary mail to the widely
15 > > subscribed security alias. That is, subscribed people get notified of
16 > > package list changes, NATTkA results, every arch doing its work.
17 > > However, in reality the security team only cares about stabilization
18 > > being started, stalled or finished -- and for that, getting the usual
19 > > 'dependent bug added/closed' mail should be sufficient.
20 > >
21 > > 2. NATTkA has no good way of distinguishing irrelevant security bugs
22 > > from security bugs where something went wrong (and NATTkA doesn't use
23 > > persistent state by design). The most important problem is that --
24 > > unlike regular stablereqs -- security bugs aren't supposed to be closed
25 > > after stabilization. It can't really distinguish a security bug 'left
26 > > open' from a security bug with incorrect package list.
27 > >
28 > > 3. Proxied maintainers without editbugs can't actually CC arches on
29 > > security bugs since the bugs are assigned to security@.
30 > >
31 > >
32 > > To resolve these problems going forward and establish consistent
33 > > behavior in the future, I'd like to propose to disable 'package list'
34 > > fields on security bugs and instead expect regular stabilization bugs to
35 > > be used (and made block the security bugs) for stabilizations. While I
36 > > understand that filing additional bugs might be cumbersome for some
37 > > people, I don't think it's such a herculean effort to outweigh
38 > > the problems solved.
39 > >
40 > > In the end, consistency is a good thing and we've introduced a dedicated
41 > > stabilization category to reduce the spread of stabilization bugs all
42 > > around the place.
43 >
44 > I love this.
45 >
46 > It sounds (from IRC) like you're on board with the idea of having
47 > nattka add kw:security to appropriate stabilization bugs.
48 >
49 > Could nattka also do something to the security@-assigned but itself to
50 > indicate that all security-supported architecture have been handled?
51 > Something like leaving a comment or fiddling with the security
52 > whiteboard.
53
54 Yeah, this shouldn't be a problem. However, I would prefer if 'security
55 supported' architectures were defined somewhere reasonably standard,
56 rather than hardcoded in nattka.
57
58 >
59 > It would be nice to be able to resolve the security@-assigned but
60 > before non-security-supported architectures are handled.
61 >
62 > To do that, I think we'd want to change what's required for the "clean
63 > up" step. Since today the "clean up" step is dropping the vulnerable
64 > package versions from the tree, it is dependent on
65 > non-security-supported architectures completing the stabilization bug.
66 > I think we'd like to break that dependence.
67 >
68 > I suggest that we redefine the "clean up" step to be: drop
69 > security-supported architectures' keywords from vulnerable versions.
70 > That would allow the security@-assigned bug to be resolved before
71 > non-security-supported architectures are finished with stabilization.
72 >
73
74 To be honest, this sounds like doubling the effort for little benefit.
75 After all, removing the old version of the package doesn't resolve any
76 problems on the end user systems -- upgrading does, and upgrading
77 usually happens entirely independently of whether we've cleaned up or
78 not.
79
80 Maybe it'd easier to release GLSAs before cleanup happens? We can
81 always go the dekeywording way if arch teams are actually slacking.
82
83 --
84 Best regards,
85 Michał Górny

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] [RFC] Decoupling stabilization from security bugs Jaco Kroon <jaco@××××××.za>