| 1 |
Jauhien Piatlicki: |
| 2 |
> Hi, |
| 3 |
> |
| 4 |
> On 09/15/2014 01:37 AM, Kent Fredric wrote: |
| 5 |
>> On 15 September 2014 11:25, hasufell <hasufell@g.o> wrote: |
| 6 |
>> |
| 7 |
>>> Robin said |
| 8 |
>>>> The Git commit-signing design explicitly signs the entire commit, |
| 9 |
>>> including blob contents, to avoid this security problem. |
| 10 |
>>> |
| 11 |
>>> Is this correct or not? |
| 12 |
>>> |
| 13 |
>> |
| 14 |
>> I can verify a commit by hand with only the commit object and gpg, but |
| 15 |
>> without any of the trees or parents. |
| 16 |
>> |
| 17 |
>> https://gist.github.com/kentfredric/8448fe55ffab7d314ecb |
| 18 |
>> |
| 19 |
>> |
| 20 |
> |
| 21 |
> So signing of git commits does not guarantee enough security (taking |
| 22 |
> that SHA1 is weak and can be broken), right? Could we than just use |
| 23 |
> usual (not thin) manifests? |
| 24 |
> |
| 25 |
|
| 26 |
* there is no known SHA-1 collision afais |
| 27 |
* calculating one isn't that hard. NSA might be able to do it in |
| 28 |
reasonable time |
| 29 |
* however, the algorithms to do that will come up with random garbage, |
| 30 |
so it's a completely different thing to hide a useful vulnerability |
| 31 |
behind a SHA-1 collision |
Archives