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You're following the wrong train down the wrong tracks. Git [0-9a-f]{40} is |
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to CVS 1[.][1-9][0-9]+. You're arguing that CVS is more secure because its |
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commits are sequential numbers. |
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|
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On Sat, Sep 20, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Ulrich Mueller <ulm@g.o> wrote: |
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|
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> >>>>> On Sat, 20 Sep 2014, hasufell wrote: |
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> |
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> >>> This is a bug in git. Do you want us to wait until it is resolved? |
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> >> |
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> >> Not a bug. There are VCSs (like Subversion or Bazaar) that use simple |
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> >> revision numbers to identify their commits. Git happens to use a hash, |
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> >> which is perfectly fine as long as accidental collisions are unlikely. |
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> >> Neither has to do anything with security, though. |
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> |
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> > Because there are other VCSs it is not a bug?? |
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> |
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> No, but with any other VCS we wouldn't have this discussion. Git using |
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> SHA-1 obscures the fact that an additional security layer is needed. |
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> This can be either a secure channel for accessing the repository |
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> (developers pushing their commits to it), or signed Manifests that |
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> ensure integrity of the tree distributed to users. |
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> |
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> > Of course it is a bug since it is in the gpg-signing chain and to |
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> > use it in a practical way is very unlikely. |
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> |
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> > So you are suggesting to not migrate at all or severely break the |
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> > workflow because someone might forge _working code_ with a specific |
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> > SHA1? There is no efficient algorithm for that afaik, those are just |
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> > about finding _any_ collision and even then it takes considerable |
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> > resources that can be used to break gentoo in much easier ways. |
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> |
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> Weakness of SHA-1 is discussed since several years, and it is |
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> generally recommended that one should slowly move away from it. |
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> Therefore I would find it strange if we (in 2014!) deployed a system |
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> relying on it, while in our present Manifest files SHA-1 was already |
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> abandoned long time ago, in favour of more secure hashes. It looks |
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> like a move in the wrong direction. |
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> |
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> Ulrich |
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> |