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Daniel Drake wrote: |
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> Hi, |
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> |
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> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our |
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> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec |
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> |
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> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are |
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> people's thoughts? |
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> |
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> Additional testing of this change would be appreciated (just ensure that |
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> nothing breaks). To do it as a one off: |
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> |
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> # mount -o remount,nosuid,noexec /proc |
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> |
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> To make it more permanent, /etc/fstab has: |
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> |
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> proc /proc proc defaults 0 0 |
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> |
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> Change to: |
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> |
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> proc /proc proc nosuid,noexec 0 0 |
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|
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Is there an open bug or security advisory for this exploit I missed? I tried the |
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CLI solution; works just fine here. No wild behavior so far. Any suggestions on |
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what to look for, or how to really hammer /proc? :) |
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-- |
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