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On Sunday 16 July 2006 10:07, Josh Saddler wrote: |
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>Daniel Drake wrote: |
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>> Hi, |
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>> |
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>> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our |
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>> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec |
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>> |
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>> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are |
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>> people's thoughts? |
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>> |
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>> Additional testing of this change would be appreciated (just ensure that |
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>> nothing breaks). To do it as a one off: |
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>> |
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>> # mount -o remount,nosuid,noexec /proc |
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>> |
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>> To make it more permanent, /etc/fstab has: |
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>> |
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>> proc /proc proc defaults 0 0 |
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>> |
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>> Change to: |
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>> |
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>> proc /proc proc nosuid,noexec 0 0 |
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> |
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>Is there an open bug or security advisory for this exploit I missed? I tried |
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> the CLI solution; works just fine here. No wild behavior so far. Any |
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> suggestions on what to look for, or how to really hammer /proc? :) |
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There is bug #140444. |
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-- |
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Christian Heim <phreak@g.o> |
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Gentoo Linux Developer |
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You're friendly kernel/vserver/openvz monkey |
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