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On Sat, Mar 26, 2011 at 10:12:10AM +0100, Andreas K. Huettel wrote: |
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> 3) Rely on an existing key list somewhere distributed in portage; the list |
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> file with the key id's (not the keys themselves) is signed with a master key. |
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> Is a mediocre and potentially insecure workaround. |
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> Pros: you can exactly decide what keys are used and trusted, without thinking |
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> about GnuPG's inner workings. A user can edit his key and the key remains |
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> trusted. |
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> Cons: Mainly that the key id is a pretty short hash afaik.(Any better-informed |
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> people around?) |
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1. Generate said list L from the GPG fields in LDAP (w/ long-form keyids) |
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2. Clear-sign L, produces L' |
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3. Include L' in /metadata/ during rsync content build. |
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3.1. Provide all L' files in a trusted Git repository for historical reference. |
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4. Tree-sign per GLEP58, such that signed list is included. |
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Pros: |
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- L' is plaintext and works well w/ rsync deltas. |
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Security weakpoints: |
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- Introduces new weak point if attacker can compromise the automated |
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clear-signing service of #2. |
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|
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> 4) Rely on an existing list of keys somewhere distributed in portage and |
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> possibly somewhere else (keyservers); a key userid is signed with a master |
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> key. Work with GnuPG's well-tested and well-thought-out trust relationships. |
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> Back to start, time to re-read the entire thread... :) |
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What does this actually add over #3 in terms of security? |
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-- |
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Robin Hugh Johnson |
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Gentoo Linux: Developer, Trustee & Infrastructure Lead |
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E-Mail : robbat2@g.o |
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GnuPG FP : 11AC BA4F 4778 E3F6 E4ED F38E B27B 944E 3488 4E85 |
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