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I'm not a lawyer either, but it's not legal to copy RAP, especially since |
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the great crisis. It's trademarked and protected. It's a pity some |
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companies abused the goodwill of the developers and misused grsec |
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technologies in the past. |
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Dw. |
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-- |
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dr Tóth Attila, Radiológus, 06-20-825-8057 |
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Attila Toth MD, Radiologist, +36-20-825-8057 |
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|
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2019.Február 24.(V) 19:18 időpontban Javier Juan Martinez Cabezon ezt írta: |
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> |
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> It's would be feasible to include Grsec RAP gcc plugin in gentoo hardened? |
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> |
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> I think it would be a better alternative than fcf-protection does |
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> |
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> |
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> On 24/02/19 16:16, "Tóth Attila" wrote: |
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>> Dear Guillaume, |
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>> |
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>> I'm not a Gentoo Dev either. |
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>> |
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>> If there's a place to promote useful gcc flags from their security |
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>> aspect, |
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>> Gentoo Hardened is a good place to become a leader of such efforts - |
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>> like |
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>> it happened in the past. |
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>> |
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>> 1. Regarding fcf-protection: |
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>> "Currently the x86 GNU/Linux target provides an implementation based on |
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>> Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)." |
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>> - anybody knows which Intel processor actually supports that since its |
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>> announcement in 2016? |
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>> - also it worth to take a look at on these comments by Spender @ |
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>> grsecurity: |
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>> https://grsecurity.net/effectiveness_of_intel_cet_against_code_reuse_attacks.php |
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>> It would be good if hardware developers would discuss their plans with |
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>> more security experts before they put something into production. |
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>> |
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>> 2. Regarding stack-clash |
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>> "Most targets do not fully support stack clash protection." |
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>> - some information would be helpful to elaborate a little bit more on |
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>> "not |
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>> fully" and exactly which targets we are talking about. Anybody has a |
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>> more |
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>> detailed documentation? |
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>> |
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>> Best regards: |
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>> Dw. |
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>> |
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> |
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> |