1 |
Hi! |
2 |
|
3 |
On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 04:27:45PM +0100, Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote: |
4 |
> I told you, with a secure TPE (so scripts fully controlled) tell me |
5 |
> how to write one kernel exploit under bash without calling external |
6 |
> code. |
7 |
|
8 |
How about |
9 |
$ perl -e 'exploit code here' |
10 |
or just |
11 |
$ perl |
12 |
exploit code here from stdin |
13 |
Ctrl-D |
14 |
? |
15 |
Is your current RBAC configuration prevent this? |
16 |
|
17 |
As for me, I tend to agree with you about RBAC, but I think to make RBAC |
18 |
really useful it rules/roles must be provided by software developers - |
19 |
just like they now provide README and Makefile, because only software |
20 |
authors actually know which files, devices and syscalls used by their |
21 |
applications and how these requirements change from version to version. |
22 |
|
23 |
I've tried different RBAC implementations few times, but got tired fixing |
24 |
roles and rules - on usual hardened workstation after enabling RBAC (even |
25 |
after auto-learning mode) everything become broken in many unexpected |
26 |
ways, and it took too many time to realize each time this isn't a bug in |
27 |
some software but just RBAC misconfiguration and fixing it. Probably |
28 |
workstation isn't good place for RBAC. But on most of my servers there are |
29 |
a lot of perl scripts, and we often add new scripts, and writing RBAC |
30 |
rules for all of them looks too complicated. Another server must have php, |
31 |
ftp, many wordpress sites and other php crap - and I can't even imagine |
32 |
how this can be secured using RBAC. |
33 |
|
34 |
BTW, while I agree with you about useless 'noexec' for /tmp, it's usually |
35 |
cheap way to stop few scriptkiddies with default exploits, so there is no |
36 |
harm in using it. And no real harm in don't using it. |
37 |
|
38 |
-- |
39 |
WBR, Alex. |