| 1 |
On 08/03/2010 05:49, Joseph C. Lininger wrote: |
| 2 |
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- |
| 3 |
> Hash: SHA256 |
| 4 |
> |
| 5 |
> |
| 6 |
>> I think I may be running short of entropy, presumed due to SSP? |
| 7 |
>> Essentially I have two or three digit numbers from /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail |
| 8 |
>> |
| 9 |
> Try timer_entropyd. It's written by the same person who wrote |
| 10 |
> audio_entropyd and video_entropyd. The up side is you don't need any |
| 11 |
> special hardware and it will jump your available entropy up by quite a |
| 12 |
> bit. Not as good as a true hardware generator most likely, but probably |
| 13 |
> perfectly fine for your purposes. |
| 14 |
> |
| 15 |
> http://www.vanheusden.com/te/ |
| 16 |
> |
| 17 |
> It's not available in portage, though I've been looking at writing an |
| 18 |
> ebuild for it. |
| 19 |
> |
| 20 |
|
| 21 |
Thanks for the suggestion - I had spotted it, but skipped over it |
| 22 |
temporarily since there was no ebuild. |
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
I also tried clrngd that someone suggested offlist - this doesn't seem |
| 25 |
to be generating entropy fast enough and it takes over 60 seconds of |
| 26 |
100% CPU to generate what it does generate. |
| 27 |
|
| 28 |
I'm fairly sure that the answer here is to switch to using a lower |
| 29 |
quality rng for the canary - this leaves the high quality rng for all |
| 30 |
important crypto related stuff where we really shouldn't be compromising |
| 31 |
on quality. I guess some patch to use network packets to seed the pool |
| 32 |
with randomness would also be useful, btu that's way beyond what I'm |
| 33 |
going to offer a patch for in the near future... |
| 34 |
|
| 35 |
I'm going to look through the older glibc patches to see how it used to |
| 36 |
be done (using /dev/erandom), but any one with more experience on why it |
| 37 |
was *removed* from current glibc would be grateful to hear your thoughts? |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
Thanks |
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
Ed W |
Archives