Gentoo Archives: gentoo-nfp

From: Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@g.o>
To: gentoo-nfp@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-nfp] Agenda item: Formalize Gentoo's org structure
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2018 17:51:03
Message-Id: 20180409175057.x6sv7atndrxi3rys@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-nfp] Agenda item: Formalize Gentoo's org structure by "Michał Górny"
1 On 18-04-09 18:57:27, Michał Górny wrote:
2 > W dniu pon, 09.04.2018 o godzinie 05∶24 -0500, użytkownik Matthew Thode
3 > napisał:
4 > > Gentoo has been known to be a two headed entity for a while. While the
5 > > fact is that only one of the heads has legal standing to be called
6 > > Gentoo, the other head has been doing most of the technical work.
7 > > Unfortunately having two heads means that there can be fighting between
8 > > them. In order to finally put the matter to some rest I seek to define
9 > > Gentoo's org structure.
10 >
11 > Currently, legally, it only consists of the following:
12 > > 1. foundation members
13 > > 2. trustees
14 > > 3. officers (don't have to be foundation members or trustees)
15 > >
16 > > I wish to extend that to the following.
17 > > 1. foundation members
18 > > 2. trustees
19 > > 3. officers (don't have to be foundation members or trustees)
20 > > 3.1 infra members (or at least the lead)
21 > > 3.2 comrel members (or at least the lead)
22 > > 3.3 council members
23 > >
24 > > Infrastructure has a clearly defined role in Gentoo. Namely that of
25 > > managing foundation infrastructure resources. Bringing those members
26 > > under the foundation's umbrella formalizes this. Infra has previously
27 > > been fairly nebulous as to who directs them (having been directed by
28 > > council, trustees and comrel).
29 > >
30 > > Comrel has the clear analog of being the HR (human relations). HR
31 > > is three to protect the business from human related infighting. Comrel
32 > > was previously under the direction of the council, primarily for
33 > > historical reasons (the foundation was not well staffed or run until
34 > > recently). I thank the council for managing this.
35 > >
36 > > Council is supposed to be the technical leadership within Gentoo, over
37 > > the last decade or so this responsibility has ballooned to encompass
38 > > things out side this scope. This seeks to clearly define the powers of
39 > > the council to that of technical leadership.
40 > >
41 > >
42 > > One of the drawbacks of this is that being an officer means being an
43 > > 'organ' of the business, meaning that some of the current members may
44 > > have conflicts with their current job. To this I ask 'Is what you are
45 > > doing now not vital? If it is doesn't that make you an organ (even if
46 > > not explicitly stated as such)?'
47 > >
48 > > One of the good things about this (other than clearly defining roles and
49 > > boundaries) is that it allows council members to server as Trustees.
50 > > This would require a bylaw change, but has been something often
51 > > complained about.
52 > >
53 >
54 > Matthew, I'm not sure where to start.
55 >
56 > Maybe I should start by apologizing for the length of this mail.
57 > I really hate to waste your time having to read all of this but in this
58 > case I believe things have gone too far just to leave things half-
59 > answered or risk misinterpretation.
60 >
61 >
62 > I find this proposal outrageous. It is a clear attack on Gentoo
63 > developers' right to self-govern. While I wouldn't call Gentoo an exact
64 > democracy, your proposal sounds like bureaucrat dictatorship. I will
65 > detail on it later on.
66 >
67 >
68 > But before that, I would like to ask why do you keep pushing forward
69 > a proposal that has seen so much negative feedback? And why do you try
70 > to push it via gentoo-nfp when you are perfectly aware that the previous
71 > discussions on gentoo-project have brought much negative feedback? Are
72 > you trying to avoid this feedback?
73 >
74
75 I keep pushing forward with this because feedback I've received from
76 others has been constructive towards this goal. I keep pursuing this
77 because it's the job of the president of the foundation to advance the
78 foundation. I this case advancing the foundation means clarifying roles
79 and relationships between the different bodies. I push for this
80 particular case as it's the one that makes the most sense from the
81 foundation's (business) viewpoint.
82
83 > Do you believe that the minor changes you've made meet the expectations
84 > of all the developers who did not like your initial proposal? Do you
85 > believe in it so much that you do not feel it appropriate to ask for
86 > their opinion on the updated proposal?
87 >
88
89 I intend to take rich0 up on his offer and allow everyone (devs and
90 non-dev foundation members) to generate proposals to metastructure changes
91 be voted upon.
92
93 > Do you believe that the developers have suddenly changed their mind
94 > and are ready to abandon self-governing themselves in favor of
95 > dictatorship of bureaucrats? Do you believe that the recent attacks of
96 > William L. Thompson Jr., Daniel Campbell or Daniel Robbins have achieved
97 > that goal? Or maybe the gentoo-dev posting restrictions? Do you know
98 > that for sure?
99 >
100
101 I think this mischaracterizes what I'm trying to work toward. The
102 reality is that the foundation (business) can reject something someone
103 does in the name of Gentoo. As I stated in my proposal I think things
104 would continue as they have been, just with a more explicit governing
105 structure (aka very little to no meddling).
106
107 As far as what you characterize as attacks goes, I don't think they were
108 necessarily attacks (other than drobbins's action that saw access
109 suspended) but somewhat misguided attempts to help. I think they may
110 have some valid points (not all points, some) but I don't like the way
111 they want about bringing them up.
112
113 > Or are you just trying to use sheer force of repetition? Are you going
114 > to push the same proposal over and over again until people agree with it
115 > just to be done with hearing about it? Or just until they get
116 > frustrated enough and stop replying? Then you could claim you had no
117 > negative feedback on 15th reiteration of the same proposal.
118 >
119
120 Until I get voted out, or am convinced otherwise I will do what I feel
121 is best for the foundation. That is what my position entails.
122
123 >
124 > But let's get to the details.
125 >
126 > Your proposal -- once again -- makes Trustees the highest-level
127 > governing body of Gentoo and reduces Council to technical matters. This
128 > is against GLEP 39 which clearly states that Council is responsible for
129 > all global decisions and as far as I'm aware is the most recent policy
130 > defining the role of Council. Unless you have a strong reason to
131 > believe that this policy has been illegally forced upon Gentoo, you are
132 > not 'formalizing' anything but attempting to change well-established
133 > metastructure and outright lying to the community that the current state
134 > is undefined.
135 >
136 > I believe that Trustees can't be the highest governing body of Gentoo
137 > for a number of reasons. I will enumerate those I can think of below:
138 >
139
140 GLEP 39 is not legally binding. This proposal would make glep 39 need
141 changes (mainly that there would be a governing body above council). At
142 that point glep 39 could possibly be made into a bylaw.
143
144 >
145 > 1. Trustee elections are not even half as democractic as Council
146 > elections.
147 >
148 > With no 'reopen nominations', with the ability to accept Trustees
149 > without a vote or for existing Trustees to appoint new Trustees for
150 > missing slots, and finally with low interest in developers becoming
151 > Trustees, this is effectively 'Trustee seat giveaway' and not
152 > an election. This is already bad enough for governing the Foundation
153 > and I am fully against extending this to governing the whole of Gentoo.
154 >
155 > And if you believe that reducing the power of Council will suddenly
156 > convince developers to increase their interest in becoming Trustees, you
157 > are wrong, for reasons outlined in further points.
158 >
159
160 Unfortunately we have not had the turnout we always with to have (for
161 nominees or voters). Also, as this is a business things are not
162 necessarily always democratic (as much as we've tried to make them be).
163
164 >
165 > 2. Bad Trustee work... increases their chances of re-election.
166 >
167 > Given that each new Trustee takes legal responsibility about the state
168 > of Foundation, he/she is directly endangered by repercussions of any
169 > problems within the Foundation, including problems caused by previous
170 > Trustees. As far as I'm aware, we hadn't established any clear way of
171 > new Trustees protecting themselves against this, and most of the new
172 > candidates aren't really capable of suing previous board 'just in case'
173 > as Kristian suggested.
174 >
175 > As a result, if Trustees leave Foundation in a bad state (which has been
176 > the case so far), then a number of candidates is going to refuse
177 > the nomination because they do not want to take responsibility for
178 > mistakes of their predecessors. And this goes on recursively. At this
179 > point, even if Trustees finally managed to finish IRS as they claim
180 > they'll do, I personally would still have serious doubt whether I could
181 > really trust things are fully solved.
182 >
183
184 D&O insurance is an option, just a very expensive one. That was the
185 first task I undertook when I was voted in/joined. Also, if no one
186 steps up and tries to clean up it'll just go on (as you mention). I
187 intend to clean this up.
188
189 >
190 > 3. Trustees have direct control over their electorate.
191 >
192 > Who votes for Trustees? Foundation members. And who appoints
193 > and removes Foundation members? Trustees, of course. So we're talking
194 > about giving away governing the whole distribution to people who
195 > directly decide who can vote for them, and who can't, and do that
196 > in rather arbitrary way.
197 >
198 > Before somebody claims that Council is in the same situation -- not
199 > exactly. The Council doesn't directly interfere with recruitment
200 > or retirement -- it only takes care of appeals. Not to mention that
201 > the rules for becoming a developer are far more precise than rules for
202 > becoming a Foundation member.
203 >
204
205 As mentioned earlier, the Foundation is a business. In practice we've
206 tried to avoid removal of members as much as possible.
207
208 >
209 > 4. Not everyone can be a legal Foundation representative.
210 >
211 > This has been the argument a lot of people mentioned. Some of our
212 > developers simply can't legally be an Officer, not to mention Trustee
213 > because of their employment or other legal positions. Your proposal
214 > unjustly prevents them from having any governing position.
215 >
216
217 Yes, it is the biggest drawback. I'm not sure how they are allowed to
218 be what in effect is an officer though (council members are in effect
219 officers, even if not explicitly so, at least in my view).
220
221 >
222 > 5. You are conflating governing and bureaucracy.
223 >
224 > What we have right now is two disjoint bodies: Council which is elected
225 > as representatives of developers, and Trustees who are responsible for
226 > dealing with the bureaucracy. With your proposal, developers are now
227 > partially governed by bureaucrats for no real reason except... we need
228 > bureaucrats, and bureaucrats want to rule us.
229 >
230 > What you're doing here is blocking competent people who were doing a
231 > good job dealing with non-technical matters on the Council just because
232 > they do not have the necessary skills or experience to do the Trustee
233 > work. And on the other hand, giving power to people who may not be
234 > trusted developer representatives just because they claim they're going
235 > to take care of the bureaucracy.
236 >
237
238 I think you are putting words in my mouth.
239
240 >
241 > 6. Trustees have serious problems dealing with their own work.
242 >
243 > Let's be honest. Trustees haven't been exactly the perfect caretakers
244 > of legal and financial matters. Even skipping the tax problems, let's
245 > talk about copyright problems. Rich Freeman has started the work on
246 > solving them long time ago. Then Trustees were responsible for it
247 > and did not manage to do anything except for copying the Rich's text
248 > with minor changes (also made by him) to Wiki.
249 >
250 > The whole copyright effort started again when I established the 'joint
251 > venture'. Which was pretty much a nice way of saying 'we will do most
252 > of it for you because otherwise it will never happen'. But sure, that
253 > was a complex problem.
254 >
255 > Just take a look at their meeting logs and see how many items keep being
256 > moved from month to month with no action taken:
257 >
258 > https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Foundation:Meetings
259 >
260 > At some point, you start thinking that Trustees are putting more effort
261 > in trying to replace Council than in actually doing the things they were
262 > elected to do. Do you really think they will be doing a better job with
263 > more responsibilities at hand?
264 >
265
266 I'd like you to restrict the time period of your attacks against the
267 trustees to the last 2 years, which have been frustrating, but
268 productive.
269
270 As far as who's been doing the work. I agree that the council (and
271 foundation) members have been doing a lot of work, particularly in the
272 copyright area. Keep in mind that rich0 is a member of the foundation
273 as well. I wish we had more capable people in the foundation doing this
274 work but no one seems to want to step into that role but only do the
275 work outside of the foundation's view then dump it in their laps.
276
277 I wasn't aware it was you who established the 'joint venture', iirc K_F
278 even told me it was my responsibility to schedule meetings because it was
279 my idea :P
280
281 >
282 > 7. Who will oversee the Trustees?
283 >
284 > Right now, the Council handles all the global decisions and appeals
285 > in Gentoo. However, if Council goes rogue and starts working against
286 > the goals of Gentoo, Trustees can intervene. If Trustees become the
287 > highest authority for decisions and appeals, who is going to intervene?
288 >
289
290 The same argument works for whatever the 'top body' ends up being, but
291 there are two options we have right now (as in you can invoke it now).
292
293 The 'general resolution' as I believe antarus mentioned would be a good
294 choice (as decisions still have to be legal of course). Our bylaws
295 even have something like this already (section 3.9, 3.12). Not the
296 best approximation, but could be reworked possibly.
297
298 The second option would be to recall the trustee(s) (section 5.6). I
299 don't think this option exists for the council.
300
301 >
302 > That's all I can think of now. But I think that's 7 reasons too many
303 > for Trustees to claim any direct leadership position. Trustees have
304 > a clearly defined role in serving and protecting Gentoo. Extending that
305 > to exercising daily power in leading Gentoo is not going to be good
306 > for the community, and certainly it is not going to be fair to other
307 > developers.
308 >
309
310 --
311 Matthew Thode (prometheanfire)

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