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On 18-04-09 18:57:27, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> W dniu pon, 09.04.2018 o godzinie 05∶24 -0500, użytkownik Matthew Thode |
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> napisał: |
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> > Gentoo has been known to be a two headed entity for a while. While the |
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> > fact is that only one of the heads has legal standing to be called |
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> > Gentoo, the other head has been doing most of the technical work. |
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> > Unfortunately having two heads means that there can be fighting between |
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> > them. In order to finally put the matter to some rest I seek to define |
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> > Gentoo's org structure. |
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> |
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> Currently, legally, it only consists of the following: |
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> > 1. foundation members |
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> > 2. trustees |
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> > 3. officers (don't have to be foundation members or trustees) |
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> > |
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> > I wish to extend that to the following. |
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> > 1. foundation members |
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> > 2. trustees |
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> > 3. officers (don't have to be foundation members or trustees) |
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> > 3.1 infra members (or at least the lead) |
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> > 3.2 comrel members (or at least the lead) |
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> > 3.3 council members |
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> > |
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> > Infrastructure has a clearly defined role in Gentoo. Namely that of |
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> > managing foundation infrastructure resources. Bringing those members |
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> > under the foundation's umbrella formalizes this. Infra has previously |
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> > been fairly nebulous as to who directs them (having been directed by |
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> > council, trustees and comrel). |
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> > |
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> > Comrel has the clear analog of being the HR (human relations). HR |
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> > is three to protect the business from human related infighting. Comrel |
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> > was previously under the direction of the council, primarily for |
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> > historical reasons (the foundation was not well staffed or run until |
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> > recently). I thank the council for managing this. |
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> > |
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> > Council is supposed to be the technical leadership within Gentoo, over |
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> > the last decade or so this responsibility has ballooned to encompass |
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> > things out side this scope. This seeks to clearly define the powers of |
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> > the council to that of technical leadership. |
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> > |
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> > |
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> > One of the drawbacks of this is that being an officer means being an |
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> > 'organ' of the business, meaning that some of the current members may |
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> > have conflicts with their current job. To this I ask 'Is what you are |
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> > doing now not vital? If it is doesn't that make you an organ (even if |
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> > not explicitly stated as such)?' |
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> > |
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> > One of the good things about this (other than clearly defining roles and |
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> > boundaries) is that it allows council members to server as Trustees. |
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> > This would require a bylaw change, but has been something often |
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> > complained about. |
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> > |
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> |
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> Matthew, I'm not sure where to start. |
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> |
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> Maybe I should start by apologizing for the length of this mail. |
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> I really hate to waste your time having to read all of this but in this |
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> case I believe things have gone too far just to leave things half- |
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> answered or risk misinterpretation. |
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> |
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> |
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> I find this proposal outrageous. It is a clear attack on Gentoo |
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> developers' right to self-govern. While I wouldn't call Gentoo an exact |
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> democracy, your proposal sounds like bureaucrat dictatorship. I will |
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> detail on it later on. |
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> |
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> |
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> But before that, I would like to ask why do you keep pushing forward |
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> a proposal that has seen so much negative feedback? And why do you try |
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> to push it via gentoo-nfp when you are perfectly aware that the previous |
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> discussions on gentoo-project have brought much negative feedback? Are |
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> you trying to avoid this feedback? |
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> |
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|
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I keep pushing forward with this because feedback I've received from |
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others has been constructive towards this goal. I keep pursuing this |
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because it's the job of the president of the foundation to advance the |
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foundation. I this case advancing the foundation means clarifying roles |
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and relationships between the different bodies. I push for this |
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particular case as it's the one that makes the most sense from the |
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foundation's (business) viewpoint. |
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|
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> Do you believe that the minor changes you've made meet the expectations |
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> of all the developers who did not like your initial proposal? Do you |
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> believe in it so much that you do not feel it appropriate to ask for |
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> their opinion on the updated proposal? |
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> |
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|
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I intend to take rich0 up on his offer and allow everyone (devs and |
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non-dev foundation members) to generate proposals to metastructure changes |
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be voted upon. |
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|
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> Do you believe that the developers have suddenly changed their mind |
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> and are ready to abandon self-governing themselves in favor of |
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> dictatorship of bureaucrats? Do you believe that the recent attacks of |
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> William L. Thompson Jr., Daniel Campbell or Daniel Robbins have achieved |
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> that goal? Or maybe the gentoo-dev posting restrictions? Do you know |
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> that for sure? |
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> |
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|
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I think this mischaracterizes what I'm trying to work toward. The |
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reality is that the foundation (business) can reject something someone |
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does in the name of Gentoo. As I stated in my proposal I think things |
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would continue as they have been, just with a more explicit governing |
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structure (aka very little to no meddling). |
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|
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As far as what you characterize as attacks goes, I don't think they were |
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necessarily attacks (other than drobbins's action that saw access |
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suspended) but somewhat misguided attempts to help. I think they may |
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have some valid points (not all points, some) but I don't like the way |
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they want about bringing them up. |
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|
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> Or are you just trying to use sheer force of repetition? Are you going |
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> to push the same proposal over and over again until people agree with it |
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> just to be done with hearing about it? Or just until they get |
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> frustrated enough and stop replying? Then you could claim you had no |
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> negative feedback on 15th reiteration of the same proposal. |
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> |
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|
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Until I get voted out, or am convinced otherwise I will do what I feel |
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is best for the foundation. That is what my position entails. |
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|
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> |
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> But let's get to the details. |
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> |
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> Your proposal -- once again -- makes Trustees the highest-level |
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> governing body of Gentoo and reduces Council to technical matters. This |
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> is against GLEP 39 which clearly states that Council is responsible for |
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> all global decisions and as far as I'm aware is the most recent policy |
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> defining the role of Council. Unless you have a strong reason to |
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> believe that this policy has been illegally forced upon Gentoo, you are |
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> not 'formalizing' anything but attempting to change well-established |
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> metastructure and outright lying to the community that the current state |
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> is undefined. |
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> |
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> I believe that Trustees can't be the highest governing body of Gentoo |
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> for a number of reasons. I will enumerate those I can think of below: |
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> |
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|
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GLEP 39 is not legally binding. This proposal would make glep 39 need |
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changes (mainly that there would be a governing body above council). At |
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that point glep 39 could possibly be made into a bylaw. |
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|
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> |
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> 1. Trustee elections are not even half as democractic as Council |
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> elections. |
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> |
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> With no 'reopen nominations', with the ability to accept Trustees |
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> without a vote or for existing Trustees to appoint new Trustees for |
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> missing slots, and finally with low interest in developers becoming |
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> Trustees, this is effectively 'Trustee seat giveaway' and not |
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> an election. This is already bad enough for governing the Foundation |
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> and I am fully against extending this to governing the whole of Gentoo. |
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> |
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> And if you believe that reducing the power of Council will suddenly |
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> convince developers to increase their interest in becoming Trustees, you |
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> are wrong, for reasons outlined in further points. |
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> |
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|
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Unfortunately we have not had the turnout we always with to have (for |
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nominees or voters). Also, as this is a business things are not |
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necessarily always democratic (as much as we've tried to make them be). |
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|
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> |
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> 2. Bad Trustee work... increases their chances of re-election. |
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> |
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> Given that each new Trustee takes legal responsibility about the state |
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> of Foundation, he/she is directly endangered by repercussions of any |
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> problems within the Foundation, including problems caused by previous |
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> Trustees. As far as I'm aware, we hadn't established any clear way of |
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> new Trustees protecting themselves against this, and most of the new |
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> candidates aren't really capable of suing previous board 'just in case' |
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> as Kristian suggested. |
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> |
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> As a result, if Trustees leave Foundation in a bad state (which has been |
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> the case so far), then a number of candidates is going to refuse |
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> the nomination because they do not want to take responsibility for |
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> mistakes of their predecessors. And this goes on recursively. At this |
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> point, even if Trustees finally managed to finish IRS as they claim |
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> they'll do, I personally would still have serious doubt whether I could |
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> really trust things are fully solved. |
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> |
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|
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D&O insurance is an option, just a very expensive one. That was the |
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first task I undertook when I was voted in/joined. Also, if no one |
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steps up and tries to clean up it'll just go on (as you mention). I |
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intend to clean this up. |
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|
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> |
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> 3. Trustees have direct control over their electorate. |
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> |
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> Who votes for Trustees? Foundation members. And who appoints |
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> and removes Foundation members? Trustees, of course. So we're talking |
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> about giving away governing the whole distribution to people who |
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> directly decide who can vote for them, and who can't, and do that |
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> in rather arbitrary way. |
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> |
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> Before somebody claims that Council is in the same situation -- not |
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> exactly. The Council doesn't directly interfere with recruitment |
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> or retirement -- it only takes care of appeals. Not to mention that |
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> the rules for becoming a developer are far more precise than rules for |
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> becoming a Foundation member. |
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> |
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|
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As mentioned earlier, the Foundation is a business. In practice we've |
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tried to avoid removal of members as much as possible. |
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|
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> |
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> 4. Not everyone can be a legal Foundation representative. |
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> |
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> This has been the argument a lot of people mentioned. Some of our |
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> developers simply can't legally be an Officer, not to mention Trustee |
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> because of their employment or other legal positions. Your proposal |
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> unjustly prevents them from having any governing position. |
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> |
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|
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Yes, it is the biggest drawback. I'm not sure how they are allowed to |
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be what in effect is an officer though (council members are in effect |
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officers, even if not explicitly so, at least in my view). |
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|
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> |
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> 5. You are conflating governing and bureaucracy. |
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> |
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> What we have right now is two disjoint bodies: Council which is elected |
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> as representatives of developers, and Trustees who are responsible for |
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> dealing with the bureaucracy. With your proposal, developers are now |
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> partially governed by bureaucrats for no real reason except... we need |
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> bureaucrats, and bureaucrats want to rule us. |
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> |
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> What you're doing here is blocking competent people who were doing a |
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> good job dealing with non-technical matters on the Council just because |
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> they do not have the necessary skills or experience to do the Trustee |
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> work. And on the other hand, giving power to people who may not be |
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> trusted developer representatives just because they claim they're going |
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> to take care of the bureaucracy. |
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> |
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|
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I think you are putting words in my mouth. |
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|
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> |
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> 6. Trustees have serious problems dealing with their own work. |
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> |
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> Let's be honest. Trustees haven't been exactly the perfect caretakers |
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> of legal and financial matters. Even skipping the tax problems, let's |
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> talk about copyright problems. Rich Freeman has started the work on |
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> solving them long time ago. Then Trustees were responsible for it |
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> and did not manage to do anything except for copying the Rich's text |
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> with minor changes (also made by him) to Wiki. |
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> |
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> The whole copyright effort started again when I established the 'joint |
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> venture'. Which was pretty much a nice way of saying 'we will do most |
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> of it for you because otherwise it will never happen'. But sure, that |
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> was a complex problem. |
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> |
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> Just take a look at their meeting logs and see how many items keep being |
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> moved from month to month with no action taken: |
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> |
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> https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Foundation:Meetings |
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> |
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> At some point, you start thinking that Trustees are putting more effort |
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> in trying to replace Council than in actually doing the things they were |
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> elected to do. Do you really think they will be doing a better job with |
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> more responsibilities at hand? |
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> |
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|
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I'd like you to restrict the time period of your attacks against the |
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trustees to the last 2 years, which have been frustrating, but |
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productive. |
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|
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As far as who's been doing the work. I agree that the council (and |
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foundation) members have been doing a lot of work, particularly in the |
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copyright area. Keep in mind that rich0 is a member of the foundation |
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as well. I wish we had more capable people in the foundation doing this |
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work but no one seems to want to step into that role but only do the |
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work outside of the foundation's view then dump it in their laps. |
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|
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I wasn't aware it was you who established the 'joint venture', iirc K_F |
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even told me it was my responsibility to schedule meetings because it was |
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my idea :P |
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|
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> |
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> 7. Who will oversee the Trustees? |
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> |
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> Right now, the Council handles all the global decisions and appeals |
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> in Gentoo. However, if Council goes rogue and starts working against |
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> the goals of Gentoo, Trustees can intervene. If Trustees become the |
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> highest authority for decisions and appeals, who is going to intervene? |
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> |
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|
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The same argument works for whatever the 'top body' ends up being, but |
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there are two options we have right now (as in you can invoke it now). |
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|
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The 'general resolution' as I believe antarus mentioned would be a good |
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choice (as decisions still have to be legal of course). Our bylaws |
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even have something like this already (section 3.9, 3.12). Not the |
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best approximation, but could be reworked possibly. |
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|
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The second option would be to recall the trustee(s) (section 5.6). I |
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don't think this option exists for the council. |
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|
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> |
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> That's all I can think of now. But I think that's 7 reasons too many |
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> for Trustees to claim any direct leadership position. Trustees have |
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> a clearly defined role in serving and protecting Gentoo. Extending that |
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> to exercising daily power in leading Gentoo is not going to be good |
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> for the community, and certainly it is not going to be fair to other |
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> developers. |
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> |
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|
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-- |
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Matthew Thode (prometheanfire) |