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On Friday, January 6, 2017 1:10:48 PM EST Andreas K. Huettel wrote: |
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> Am Donnerstag, 5. Januar 2017, 15:36:45 CET schrieb Matthew Thode: |
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> > Merging Trustees and Council / Developers and Foundation |
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> |
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> [...] |
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> |
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> > This split is suboptimal for Gentoo (all of it). |
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> |
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> I agree with this statement, though probably for slightly different reasons. |
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> |
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> In my opinion the main problem with the current situation is that it invites |
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> to "game the system". People unhappy with a council decision run to the |
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> foundation trustees. When foundation and council cooperate well, that's no |
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> problem, but as soon as personalities clash and responsibilities are ill |
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> defined, anyone can trigger a "Gentoo constitutional crisis" at will. |
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|
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One difference is Trustees handle the legal liability. It is possible council |
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could make a decision that would make Gentoo liable. In that event, the |
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Trustees doing their job of protecting Gentoo. Would be acting in Gentoo's |
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best interest to avoid such potential liability. |
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|
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There are lots of frivolous law suits in the US. Many times because |
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individuals suing organizations are not seen as equal. Organizations can lose |
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more than individuals. As in someone suing Gentoo has a greater chance of |
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winning, then say Gentoo suing that same person. |
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|
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Even if the person has no case, a law suit can bog things down and it is |
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something Gentoo or any organization would want to avoid at all costs. |
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|
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> That sounds like a good plan to me, in principle, however we need to figure |
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> out some details first. I think we really need to merge the voting pools, so |
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> there is one well-defined electorate for the board. Also, I think that |
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> voting for the board should be restricted to Gentoo developers (with or |
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> without main tree access), since that provides a good "proof of productive |
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> involvment". |
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|
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Foundation membership was not directly tied to Developer status. Say you |
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retired, should all your previous efforts become negated? There are provisions |
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in the by laws to extend foundation membership as long as interest remains. |
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|
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https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/ |
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Foundation:Bylaws#Section_4.4._Continuation_of_Membership |
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|
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I seem to recall provisions that if someone failed to vote a few times they |
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would lose membership. But I am not seeing where you can lose membership short |
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of a request. Seems foundation membership is permanent unless requested |
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removal. |
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|
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> |
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> The other side is that we can't predict worldwide legal impact, and that it |
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> may well be disadvantageous for someone in another country to officially be |
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> member of a US legal body. |
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|
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US tends to be the most free and open. Most FOSS projects with a structure are |
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in the US. The SPI is in the US. |
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|
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Not saying there is interest, but if Gentoo was say moved to another country. |
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That may further fall under export restrictions even for an open entity. |
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Assets would have to be transferred etc. |
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|
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> * Board members have a different legal status. |
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> It may become impossible for some of our developers to be elected to the |
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> Gentoo "board", since the legal position may lead to conflicts of interest |
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> with real-life work. |
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|
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This is very valid, and there might be further restrictions as to who can |
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serve on the board. Depending on what country they reside. |
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|
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> * We need to figure out what to do with non-dev foundation members. |
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|
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Likely need different levels of membership that include the community, Gentoo |
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staff, and also corporations. If companies can play a role in Gentoo, they may |
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provide additional funds, etc. |
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|
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> * Anything else? |
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> |
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> |
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> So how can we solve this? |
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> |
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> [Disclaimer: I haven't done any detailed research yet, so some of the ideas |
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> presented below may well be premature.] |
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> |
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> * Transfer administration of Gentoo assets and finanicals to an organization |
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> as, e.g., SPI ( http://www.spi-inc.org/ ). See e.g. http://www.spi-inc.org/ |
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> projects/ for references. |
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|
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That does not change the US legal issues. The SPI is not a legal body, they |
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use the SLFC. Also in the US, as is the EFF. |
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|
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> * Dissolve the Gentoo Foundation. |
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|
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Good luck, though what many do not seem to realize is the Gentoo Foundation |
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does not really legally exist now. |
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|
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> This means: |
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> |
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> * Anyone now running for trustees can run for council and be involved in all |
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> aspects of Gentoo oversight. |
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|
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If no foundation, no trustees. No copyright and other legal protection as no |
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entity owns the rights to such. Meaning anyone can have their own Gentoo and |
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who could say who is allowed to use that name, logo, etc. Who owns the IP etc. |
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|
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> * There is only one controlling body (I guess whether we name it "board" or |
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> "council" doesn't matter). |
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Most companies do not have 1 entity. They have a board, officers, etc. |
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> * The part of Gentoo where mistakes are fatal (IRS filings, corporate |
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> status, trademarks, financial statements) is handled by professionals (or |
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> not relevant anymore). |
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|
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I do not think you fully understand what you are speaking about. There is no |
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avoiding some of the legalities. Any project faces the same, why many go to |
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the SPI to not deal with it, but comply with requirements. |
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> [Robin is doing a great job of handling our finances at the moment, and it's |
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> good that the trustees are very active now. As in all volunteer |
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> organizations, we can't take that continuously for granted though.] |
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Really then why am I treated how I am? Robin is doing minor things compared to |
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what I have done. Robin also not being a US citizen will have issues and be a |
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bit harder to do something things that are easier done from within. |
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|
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This fell to him, because Gentoo drove others with such abilities away. No one |
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else stepped up so Robin is now. But the mess is pretty serious and goes back |
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to 2004. |
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> * The Gentoo "council" or "board" does not involve any legal status which |
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> can make it difficult for anyone to run. |
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The board does have legal status. The council and any other body has no legal |
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status. |
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> * The electorate lists for the "council" or "board" are handled by |
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> ourselves, and do not require membership of any legal body. |
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Again you have to have something legal to protect the name and other IP. There |
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is no getting around that period. |
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There was a reason Daniel Robbins created the foundation when he was leaving |
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Gentoo. He changed the structure, transferred assets, and was the only one |
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doing things the right way legally. |
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|
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If nothing else, Gentoo could really use Daniel as a steward for the |
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Foundation. Gentoo's registered agent is Daniels attorney. Daniel lives in New |
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Mexico. A few things that make him ideal to be involved. Any reasoning to keep |
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him out makes no sense from that perspective. Unless there is another dev who |
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could be a trustee residing in New Mexico. Maybe an officer. |
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-- |
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William L. Thomson Jr. |