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On Thu, 2020-06-04 at 09:12 -0400, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 3:15 AM Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: |
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> > 1. Technical lead -- a person with exceptional technical talents that |
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> > would build the vision of Gentoo from technical perspective, i.e. make |
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> > a distribution that people would love using. Initially, this role could |
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> > be taken by the QA lead. |
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> > |
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> > 2. Social lead -- a person with exceptional social skills that would |
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> > build the vision of Gentoo from community perspective, i.e. make |
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> > a distribution that people would love contributing to. Initially, this |
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> > role would taken by the ComRel lead. |
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> > |
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> > 3. Organization lead -- a person with (exceptional) business skills that |
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> > would take care of all the financial and organizational aspects of |
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> > Gentoo, i.e. make a distribution that sustains. Initially, this role |
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> > would be taken by the Foundation president. |
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> > |
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> |
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> A few thoughts: |
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> |
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> 1. There may be some legal challenges with the Foundation around |
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> this, but I don't want to elaborate on this. Many are obvious. |
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|
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I don't want to shoot it down entirely because we're bound |
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to the Foundation that some of the Trustees were promising to disband |
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for years. For now, let's assume it doesn't necessarily exist, |
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and the organization triumvir is the person interacting with Foundation |
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or any other legal body. |
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|
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|
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> 3. Do all decisions require a majority of the 3, or will these |
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> individuals have their own scope? Will a new technical GLEP just be |
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> approved by the "tech lead" or all three? Could the two non-tech |
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> leads override the tech lead on a tech decision? Obviously the goal |
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> is collaboration but presumably you want this to solve situations |
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> where collaboration already fails. I won't go on forever but I could |
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> see challenges either way. |
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|
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I dare say that one of them can make decisions if the two other don't |
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object to them. So it's mostly a matter of establishing an agreement |
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between the three whether they want to get involved every time, |
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or approve deferring specific kind of decisions to one of them. |
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|
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In either case, I honestly doubt that having to wait for two others to |
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step in would be worse than the current status quo of waiting up to |
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a month for Council to meet and decide, possibly reading the proposals |
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last minute and not even having time to provide feedback without |
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deferring it further. |
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|
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> 4. How does accountability work? Are we going to get volunteers who |
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> are going to be competent and accept singular accountability without |
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> compensation? We struggle to fill Trustee slots and their |
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> responsibilities are somewhat nebulous/dilute. Will somebody |
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> competent want to be singularly responsible for all fiscal problems |
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> without compensation? Don't get me wrong - singular accountability |
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> works well in practice but usually these roles are well-compensated. |
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> I could see this being a bigger problem with the org lead role. |
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|
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I don't think we can know unless we see. It much depends on what |
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happens with the Foundation -- it may continue existing with lead org |
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being responsible for interacting with it, or be replaced by another org |
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with org lead being responsible for communicating with them. |
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|
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> 5. I could see a lot of bleed-over. If you want to stack the |
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> leadership with pro/anti-emacs members, why would you limit that to |
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> only the technical role? Obviously I'm more concerned with more |
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> timely issues but we all know of a bunch of hot-button topics where |
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> top-down control can be used to push an agenda. So you could end up |
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> with an org lead who cares little about the financials simply because |
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> they have the right position on the hot topic of the day. Today these |
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> jobs are more delegated so that the elected board can represent the |
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> community but delegate the actual work to people who are more focused |
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> on the actual work. Sure, you could blame the voters for this sort of |
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> problem, but we already know how people tend to vote so we're not |
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> entirely blame-free if we set it up this way... |
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> |
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|
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I don't really understand why you assume that such a thing would happen. |
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Did we ever really have someone *that* unprofessional on the Council or |
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Trustees to push puny personal agenda over the best interest |
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of the distribution? I don't see any possible change here. The same |
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problem can happen whether we're talking of 1, 3, 7 or 12 people |
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in charge. Well, you could even argue that the latter is even more |
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possible because the responsibility is diluted, while if there's just |
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one responsible person, then the full blame goes to that person. |
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|
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |