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(Keep in mind that these aren't intended as "hard" objections - just |
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trying to flesh this out a bit.) |
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|
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On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 11:19 AM Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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> On Thu, 2020-06-04 at 09:12 -0400, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> > On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 3:15 AM Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: |
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> > |
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> > 3. Do all decisions require a majority of the 3, or will these |
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> > individuals have their own scope? Will a new technical GLEP just be |
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> > approved by the "tech lead" or all three? Could the two non-tech |
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> > leads override the tech lead on a tech decision? Obviously the goal |
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> > is collaboration but presumably you want this to solve situations |
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> > where collaboration already fails. I won't go on forever but I could |
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> > see challenges either way. |
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> |
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> I dare say that one of them can make decisions if the two other don't |
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> object to them. So it's mostly a matter of establishing an agreement |
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> between the three whether they want to get involved every time, |
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> or approve deferring specific kind of decisions to one of them. |
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> |
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|
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Ok. I agree that this is how this would normally work, but if there |
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is disagreement it is 2/3 majority rules. |
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|
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I'll get to intentional game-playing at the end, but let's assume a |
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completely innocent scenario. |
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|
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Imagine Joe is great with financials and has interest in the org lead |
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role, and there isn't much other interest in the job. The community |
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is happy with his work in the org lead role. However, due to the fact |
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that delegation to the tech lead is only by mutual agreement, Joe ends |
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up having a bit of an extra influence on the tech side of the distro |
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even though nobody really wants him in that role. If nothing else he |
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has way more of a voice in the leadership team than an average |
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dev/etc. |
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|
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You could argue that this is a feature or a bug depending on your |
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perspective. Joe is putting in a lot of work, so maybe a bit of extra |
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bikeshedding should be a perk. On the other hand, why should Joe be |
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allowed that role? And of course Joe and the people lead might think |
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we're about to make a really stupid tech decision and override the |
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tech lead. |
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|
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Not suggesting this is a show-stopper - just something to consider. |
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|
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> > 5. I could see a lot of bleed-over. If you want to stack the |
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> > leadership with pro/anti-emacs members, why would you limit that to |
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> > only the technical role? Obviously I'm more concerned with more |
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> > timely issues but we all know of a bunch of hot-button topics where |
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> > top-down control can be used to push an agenda. So you could end up |
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> > with an org lead who cares little about the financials simply because |
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> > they have the right position on the hot topic of the day. Today these |
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> > jobs are more delegated so that the elected board can represent the |
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> > community but delegate the actual work to people who are more focused |
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> > on the actual work. Sure, you could blame the voters for this sort of |
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> > problem, but we already know how people tend to vote so we're not |
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> > entirely blame-free if we set it up this way... |
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> > |
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> |
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> I don't really understand why you assume that such a thing would happen. |
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> Did we ever really have someone *that* unprofessional on the Council or |
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> Trustees to push puny personal agenda over the best interest |
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> of the distribution? I don't see any possible change here. The same |
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> problem can happen whether we're talking of 1, 3, 7 or 12 people |
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> in charge. Well, you could even argue that the latter is even more |
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> possible because the responsibility is diluted, while if there's just |
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> one responsible person, then the full blame goes to that person. |
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|
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I'm just thinking about human nature here. Maybe it is concerning |
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systemd. Or maybe it is concerning the Code of Conduct or Social |
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Contract. There are always going to be contentious issues that are |
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often only semi-technical in nature and you can't always solve it with |
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a USE flag. |
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|
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One of the differences today is that we separate the role of SME from |
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the role of decider. You can have a board that is just focused on |
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direction and overall policy/strategy, but they aren't the ones |
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leading QA. You can have a board of directors who oversees |
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everything, but they can appoint a Treasurer. Campaigns for |
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Council/Trustees in the past certainly have touched on ideological |
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issues (role of comrel/CoC and level of enforcement, Foundation vs |
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umbrella, etc). |
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|
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In this model the decider is more of an SME. It is more of a |
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technocracy. The problem is that how do you vote to support having an |
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umbrella org if the most competent person to actually make sure the |
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taxes get filed wants us to run our own Foundation? There is less |
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separation of policymaking from execution this way. |
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|
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I think the result is that ideology will still end up dominating, and |
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instead of the most competent SME for tech/people/org you end up with |
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3 people who have the views everybody likes the most who will just |
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appoint other people do do the tech/people/org, which basically makes |
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it no different from what we have now. I'd argue that instead of 3 |
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separate elections it might be better to just have one election and |
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take the top 3 that way, and not give them titles - it just turns into |
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a combined Council/Trustees of 3. |
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|
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The problem with having 3 separate elections is the |
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first-past-the-post issue: if 55% of the community is pro-systemd you |
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end up with 3 pro-systemd candidates, instead of maybe more of a |
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diverse mix with a majority in one direction. |
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|
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In an ideal world I agree that this wouldn't be a problem, but I'm |
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just thinking about human nature here. And I'm not saying people are |
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even being greedy - they just want to see their viewpoints |
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represented. |
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|
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In this sense, the disagreement across Council/Trustee members maybe |
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should be seen as more of a feature and less of a bug. Sure, |
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decisions would be easier if they all agreed, but that also means that |
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decisions would be easier even if 40% of the community strongly |
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disagreed with them. That spirit of independence in these bodies |
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largely reflects the attitude of the Gentoo community as a whole. |
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|
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Again, this isn't meant to be some argument that we absolutely |
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shouldn't do it this way. My intent here is to raise some things to |
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think about. There are some cons that go with the pros, and we should |
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just be aware of them. I'm not saying they all have to be mitigated |
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in the design, though when straightforward to do so maybe some could |
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be. |
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|
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-- |
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Rich |
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|
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-- |
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Rich |