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On 14/10/16 08:43 AM, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 8:08 AM, Ian Stakenvicius <axs@g.o> wrote: |
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>> |
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>> The tricky technical part here that I worry about is the Gentoo Dev |
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>> <-> Gentoo Staff assertion, and the hard |
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>> staff-must-be-foundation-member and foundation-member-must-be-staff |
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>> rules listed above. Loss of foundation membership seems that it must |
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>> remove staff status by definition, but since dev's are staff simply |
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>> because they're dev's, are they still a dev when they lose their staff |
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>> status? |
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>> |
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> |
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> Yes |
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> |
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>> Now, there may well be good reason to force the Dev<->Foundation |
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>> member assumption. However I think the Dev<->Staff thing should |
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>> probably be decoupled if one cannot be staff without being a |
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>> foundation member. |
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> |
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> [...] two different pools of voters (Foundation members and |
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> "Developers" (which today includes anybody with an @g.o address even |
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> if they don't have commit access - the proposal splits that into Staff |
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> and Developers) |
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|
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|
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By definition #1, if you're a dev then you're staff; staff is a |
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superset of dev but there's no separation there based on the |
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definitions listed. There needs to be a classification for |
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non-staff-dev if a dev loses foundation membership due to the |
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staff<->foundation hard coupling and whatever rules there are that |
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revokes foundation membership and therefore staff status, but can |
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still remain a dev. |
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|
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OR, don't couple dev to staff so that devs have a different (sub)set |
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of rules regarding foundation membership revocation. |
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|
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|
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|
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> If we want to rationalize the leadership, we also need to deal with |
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> their constituencies. |
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> |
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> Let's take for example the case of somebody booted as a Dev because of |
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> some CoC violation. For the sake of simplicity let's assume it was an |
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> open-and-shut case perfectly handled and Comrel worked in a manner all |
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> would agree with. Under our current model, they would stop being a |
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> dev and might be banned from IRC/etc. However, they can still vote |
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> for Trustees. Does that really make sense? Likewise, if somebody |
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> leaves due to inactivity but keeps voting in Trustee elections, they |
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> also can remain part of the Foundation indefinitely. |
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> |
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> I'm sure our "alumni" in general care about Gentoo, but the reality is |
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> that they don't really have much involvement in the day-to-day. Do we |
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> want them picking our leaders/etc? Today the functions of the |
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> Trustees are more limited, so it hasn't been as large an issue (though |
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> as has been pointed out, the legal powers of the Trustees are quite |
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> large and even if they wisely choose not to exercise them carelessly |
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> we should certainly exercise care with who we trust in this role). |
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> However, if we want to expand their powers in practice (setting aside |
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> whether they already have them legally) then we should probably think |
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> about who they answer to. Suppose we did come up with a new Comrel |
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> GLEP and decided to put it up to a general vote for approval; right |
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> now we need to figure out which of the two groups of constituents to |
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> poll. |
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> |
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> I don't think we need to add a lot of bureaucracy in practice to make |
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> this work. In general anybody qualified to be a dev is already |
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> qualified to be a Foundation member, even if we make them apply for it |
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> currently. While we don't automatically boot people who aren't devs I |
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> don't see why this would become a problem if the Foundation is |
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> overseeing the processes by which people leave anyway. |
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> |
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> The only real administrative burden it would place on devs is the |
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> requirements to vote for a Trustee at least once every two years. I'm |
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> all ears if somebody has a way to make that go away. The practical |
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> issue here is the need to have a quorum under New Mexico law, so if we |
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> get low turnout the election may not be valid. While this hasn't come |
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> up, there is another benefit to making the pool of foundation members |
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> both large and reasonably active: it makes any kind of "hostile |
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> takeover" much harder to pull off, while actually making a "good |
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> takeover" easier. If some kind of outsider wants to infiltrate they |
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> need to get a quorum to show up to a meeting and control a majority of |
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> votes there, and that is harder when there are more members required |
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> to constitute a quorum. On the other hand, if somehow things get out |
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> of control and the community needs to take things back, then not |
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> having deadwood in the voting rolls means that those who are actively |
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> involved would find it easier to constitute a quorum at such a |
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> meeting. Really, you just want the legal representation of the |
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> organization to match those who are actively a part of it. |
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> |
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> So, the question becomes is compulsory voting a reasonable price to |
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> pay for better governance. In some (but not many) countries they feel |
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> strongly enough about such things that they actually fine you for |
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> failing to vote. |
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> |
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> If we just maintain the status quo across the board I can see less |
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> urgency here. However, if we're going to go so far as to consider |
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> putting the Trustees at the top of the food chain wouldn't it make |
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> sense to also take a look at how they get elected? And why would we |
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> want them maintaining multiple sets of criteria and admission |
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> processes for the two groups of members they'd now administer? |
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> |
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> All that said, this should also demonstrate that "re-organizing" |
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> Gentoo isn't really just as simple as changing a word in the Wiki |
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> about where Comrel appeals go. There are a multitude of concerns that |
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> need to be dealt with. |
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> |
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OK so my issue is that the proposal as i've read it so far (which to |
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be fair is only a dozen or so posts in the backlog) seems to say that |
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the relationship goes the other way around from what you've described |
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above -- in what you say above it seems that the idea here is to allow |
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for foundation members to be a subset of dev's but also include staff, |
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and be more limiting. However it seems to me that devs are a complete |
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subset of staff in the proposal and therefore any change in foundation |
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member (and therefore staff) status automatically affects dev status, |
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or at least that this is an undefined state. |
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|
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I don't really have an opinion of what it is that's attempting to be |
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achieved by the changes (at least, not yet), so long as the text makes |
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it clear what the classifications are and there isn't any ambiguity |
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between how a change in state of one classification affects another. |