Gentoo Archives: gentoo-project

From: Ian Stakenvicius <axs@g.o>
To: gentoo-project@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-project] Foundation membership and who can join
Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 14:17:13
Message-Id: f7ee2bb9-1048-82e8-41a5-7d938cf2344d@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-project] Foundation membership and who can join by Rich Freeman
1 On 14/10/16 08:43 AM, Rich Freeman wrote:
2 > On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 8:08 AM, Ian Stakenvicius <axs@g.o> wrote:
3 >>
4 >> The tricky technical part here that I worry about is the Gentoo Dev
5 >> <-> Gentoo Staff assertion, and the hard
6 >> staff-must-be-foundation-member and foundation-member-must-be-staff
7 >> rules listed above. Loss of foundation membership seems that it must
8 >> remove staff status by definition, but since dev's are staff simply
9 >> because they're dev's, are they still a dev when they lose their staff
10 >> status?
11 >>
12 >
13 > Yes
14 >
15 >> Now, there may well be good reason to force the Dev<->Foundation
16 >> member assumption. However I think the Dev<->Staff thing should
17 >> probably be decoupled if one cannot be staff without being a
18 >> foundation member.
19 >
20 > [...] two different pools of voters (Foundation members and
21 > "Developers" (which today includes anybody with an @g.o address even
22 > if they don't have commit access - the proposal splits that into Staff
23 > and Developers)
24
25
26 By definition #1, if you're a dev then you're staff; staff is a
27 superset of dev but there's no separation there based on the
28 definitions listed. There needs to be a classification for
29 non-staff-dev if a dev loses foundation membership due to the
30 staff<->foundation hard coupling and whatever rules there are that
31 revokes foundation membership and therefore staff status, but can
32 still remain a dev.
33
34 OR, don't couple dev to staff so that devs have a different (sub)set
35 of rules regarding foundation membership revocation.
36
37
38
39 > If we want to rationalize the leadership, we also need to deal with
40 > their constituencies.
41 >
42 > Let's take for example the case of somebody booted as a Dev because of
43 > some CoC violation. For the sake of simplicity let's assume it was an
44 > open-and-shut case perfectly handled and Comrel worked in a manner all
45 > would agree with. Under our current model, they would stop being a
46 > dev and might be banned from IRC/etc. However, they can still vote
47 > for Trustees. Does that really make sense? Likewise, if somebody
48 > leaves due to inactivity but keeps voting in Trustee elections, they
49 > also can remain part of the Foundation indefinitely.
50 >
51 > I'm sure our "alumni" in general care about Gentoo, but the reality is
52 > that they don't really have much involvement in the day-to-day. Do we
53 > want them picking our leaders/etc? Today the functions of the
54 > Trustees are more limited, so it hasn't been as large an issue (though
55 > as has been pointed out, the legal powers of the Trustees are quite
56 > large and even if they wisely choose not to exercise them carelessly
57 > we should certainly exercise care with who we trust in this role).
58 > However, if we want to expand their powers in practice (setting aside
59 > whether they already have them legally) then we should probably think
60 > about who they answer to. Suppose we did come up with a new Comrel
61 > GLEP and decided to put it up to a general vote for approval; right
62 > now we need to figure out which of the two groups of constituents to
63 > poll.
64 >
65 > I don't think we need to add a lot of bureaucracy in practice to make
66 > this work. In general anybody qualified to be a dev is already
67 > qualified to be a Foundation member, even if we make them apply for it
68 > currently. While we don't automatically boot people who aren't devs I
69 > don't see why this would become a problem if the Foundation is
70 > overseeing the processes by which people leave anyway.
71 >
72 > The only real administrative burden it would place on devs is the
73 > requirements to vote for a Trustee at least once every two years. I'm
74 > all ears if somebody has a way to make that go away. The practical
75 > issue here is the need to have a quorum under New Mexico law, so if we
76 > get low turnout the election may not be valid. While this hasn't come
77 > up, there is another benefit to making the pool of foundation members
78 > both large and reasonably active: it makes any kind of "hostile
79 > takeover" much harder to pull off, while actually making a "good
80 > takeover" easier. If some kind of outsider wants to infiltrate they
81 > need to get a quorum to show up to a meeting and control a majority of
82 > votes there, and that is harder when there are more members required
83 > to constitute a quorum. On the other hand, if somehow things get out
84 > of control and the community needs to take things back, then not
85 > having deadwood in the voting rolls means that those who are actively
86 > involved would find it easier to constitute a quorum at such a
87 > meeting. Really, you just want the legal representation of the
88 > organization to match those who are actively a part of it.
89 >
90 > So, the question becomes is compulsory voting a reasonable price to
91 > pay for better governance. In some (but not many) countries they feel
92 > strongly enough about such things that they actually fine you for
93 > failing to vote.
94 >
95 > If we just maintain the status quo across the board I can see less
96 > urgency here. However, if we're going to go so far as to consider
97 > putting the Trustees at the top of the food chain wouldn't it make
98 > sense to also take a look at how they get elected? And why would we
99 > want them maintaining multiple sets of criteria and admission
100 > processes for the two groups of members they'd now administer?
101 >
102 > All that said, this should also demonstrate that "re-organizing"
103 > Gentoo isn't really just as simple as changing a word in the Wiki
104 > about where Comrel appeals go. There are a multitude of concerns that
105 > need to be dealt with.
106 >
107
108
109 OK so my issue is that the proposal as i've read it so far (which to
110 be fair is only a dozen or so posts in the backlog) seems to say that
111 the relationship goes the other way around from what you've described
112 above -- in what you say above it seems that the idea here is to allow
113 for foundation members to be a subset of dev's but also include staff,
114 and be more limiting. However it seems to me that devs are a complete
115 subset of staff in the proposal and therefore any change in foundation
116 member (and therefore staff) status automatically affects dev status,
117 or at least that this is an undefined state.
118
119 I don't really have an opinion of what it is that's attempting to be
120 achieved by the changes (at least, not yet), so long as the text makes
121 it clear what the classifications are and there isn't any ambiguity
122 between how a change in state of one classification affects another.

Attachments

File name MIME type
signature.asc application/pgp-signature

Replies