Gentoo Archives: gentoo-project

From: Daniel Campbell <zlg@g.o>
To: gentoo-project@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-project] Foundation membership and who can join
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2016 08:08:56
Message-Id: 1c21c8dd-2241-3f72-9064-79214beba0ad@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-project] Foundation membership and who can join by Ian Stakenvicius
1 On 10/14/2016 07:17 AM, Ian Stakenvicius wrote:
2 > On 14/10/16 08:43 AM, Rich Freeman wrote:
3 >> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 8:08 AM, Ian Stakenvicius <axs@g.o> wrote:
4 >>>
5 >>> The tricky technical part here that I worry about is the Gentoo Dev
6 >>> <-> Gentoo Staff assertion, and the hard
7 >>> staff-must-be-foundation-member and foundation-member-must-be-staff
8 >>> rules listed above. Loss of foundation membership seems that it must
9 >>> remove staff status by definition, but since dev's are staff simply
10 >>> because they're dev's, are they still a dev when they lose their staff
11 >>> status?
12 >>>
13 >>
14 >> Yes
15 >>
16 >>> Now, there may well be good reason to force the Dev<->Foundation
17 >>> member assumption. However I think the Dev<->Staff thing should
18 >>> probably be decoupled if one cannot be staff without being a
19 >>> foundation member.
20 >>
21 >> [...] two different pools of voters (Foundation members and
22 >> "Developers" (which today includes anybody with an @g.o address even
23 >> if they don't have commit access - the proposal splits that into Staff
24 >> and Developers)
25 >
26 >
27 > By definition #1, if you're a dev then you're staff; staff is a
28 > superset of dev but there's no separation there based on the
29 > definitions listed. There needs to be a classification for
30 > non-staff-dev if a dev loses foundation membership due to the
31 > staff<->foundation hard coupling and whatever rules there are that
32 > revokes foundation membership and therefore staff status, but can
33 > still remain a dev.
34 >
35 > OR, don't couple dev to staff so that devs have a different (sub)set
36 > of rules regarding foundation membership revocation.
37 >
38 >
39 >
40 >> If we want to rationalize the leadership, we also need to deal with
41 >> their constituencies.
42 >>
43 >> Let's take for example the case of somebody booted as a Dev because of
44 >> some CoC violation. For the sake of simplicity let's assume it was an
45 >> open-and-shut case perfectly handled and Comrel worked in a manner all
46 >> would agree with. Under our current model, they would stop being a
47 >> dev and might be banned from IRC/etc. However, they can still vote
48 >> for Trustees. Does that really make sense? Likewise, if somebody
49 >> leaves due to inactivity but keeps voting in Trustee elections, they
50 >> also can remain part of the Foundation indefinitely.
51 >>
52 >> I'm sure our "alumni" in general care about Gentoo, but the reality is
53 >> that they don't really have much involvement in the day-to-day. Do we
54 >> want them picking our leaders/etc? Today the functions of the
55 >> Trustees are more limited, so it hasn't been as large an issue (though
56 >> as has been pointed out, the legal powers of the Trustees are quite
57 >> large and even if they wisely choose not to exercise them carelessly
58 >> we should certainly exercise care with who we trust in this role).
59 >> However, if we want to expand their powers in practice (setting aside
60 >> whether they already have them legally) then we should probably think
61 >> about who they answer to. Suppose we did come up with a new Comrel
62 >> GLEP and decided to put it up to a general vote for approval; right
63 >> now we need to figure out which of the two groups of constituents to
64 >> poll.
65 >>
66 >> I don't think we need to add a lot of bureaucracy in practice to make
67 >> this work. In general anybody qualified to be a dev is already
68 >> qualified to be a Foundation member, even if we make them apply for it
69 >> currently. While we don't automatically boot people who aren't devs I
70 >> don't see why this would become a problem if the Foundation is
71 >> overseeing the processes by which people leave anyway.
72 >>
73 >> The only real administrative burden it would place on devs is the
74 >> requirements to vote for a Trustee at least once every two years. I'm
75 >> all ears if somebody has a way to make that go away. The practical
76 >> issue here is the need to have a quorum under New Mexico law, so if we
77 >> get low turnout the election may not be valid. While this hasn't come
78 >> up, there is another benefit to making the pool of foundation members
79 >> both large and reasonably active: it makes any kind of "hostile
80 >> takeover" much harder to pull off, while actually making a "good
81 >> takeover" easier. If some kind of outsider wants to infiltrate they
82 >> need to get a quorum to show up to a meeting and control a majority of
83 >> votes there, and that is harder when there are more members required
84 >> to constitute a quorum. On the other hand, if somehow things get out
85 >> of control and the community needs to take things back, then not
86 >> having deadwood in the voting rolls means that those who are actively
87 >> involved would find it easier to constitute a quorum at such a
88 >> meeting. Really, you just want the legal representation of the
89 >> organization to match those who are actively a part of it.
90 >>
91 >> So, the question becomes is compulsory voting a reasonable price to
92 >> pay for better governance. In some (but not many) countries they feel
93 >> strongly enough about such things that they actually fine you for
94 >> failing to vote.
95 >>
96 >> If we just maintain the status quo across the board I can see less
97 >> urgency here. However, if we're going to go so far as to consider
98 >> putting the Trustees at the top of the food chain wouldn't it make
99 >> sense to also take a look at how they get elected? And why would we
100 >> want them maintaining multiple sets of criteria and admission
101 >> processes for the two groups of members they'd now administer?
102 >>
103 >> All that said, this should also demonstrate that "re-organizing"
104 >> Gentoo isn't really just as simple as changing a word in the Wiki
105 >> about where Comrel appeals go. There are a multitude of concerns that
106 >> need to be dealt with.
107 >>
108 >
109 >
110 > OK so my issue is that the proposal as i've read it so far (which to
111 > be fair is only a dozen or so posts in the backlog) seems to say that
112 > the relationship goes the other way around from what you've described
113 > above -- in what you say above it seems that the idea here is to allow
114 > for foundation members to be a subset of dev's but also include staff,
115 > and be more limiting. However it seems to me that devs are a complete
116 > subset of staff in the proposal and therefore any change in foundation
117 > member (and therefore staff) status automatically affects dev status,
118 > or at least that this is an undefined state.
119 >
120 > I don't really have an opinion of what it is that's attempting to be
121 > achieved by the changes (at least, not yet), so long as the text makes
122 > it clear what the classifications are and there isn't any ambiguity
123 > between how a change in state of one classification affects another.
124 >
125 >
126 +1. I think all anyone involved in this discussion wants is clearer,
127 fairer standards for all staff+devs+foundation members. And hopefully,
128 enough introspection to question whether past decisions were correct.
129
130 --
131 Daniel Campbell - Gentoo Developer
132 OpenPGP Key: 0x1EA055D6 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net
133 fpr: AE03 9064 AE00 053C 270C 1DE4 6F7A 9091 1EA0 55D6

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