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On 10/14/2016 07:17 AM, Ian Stakenvicius wrote: |
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> On 14/10/16 08:43 AM, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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>> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 8:08 AM, Ian Stakenvicius <axs@g.o> wrote: |
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>>> |
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>>> The tricky technical part here that I worry about is the Gentoo Dev |
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>>> <-> Gentoo Staff assertion, and the hard |
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>>> staff-must-be-foundation-member and foundation-member-must-be-staff |
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>>> rules listed above. Loss of foundation membership seems that it must |
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>>> remove staff status by definition, but since dev's are staff simply |
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>>> because they're dev's, are they still a dev when they lose their staff |
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>>> status? |
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>>> |
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>> |
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>> Yes |
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>> |
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>>> Now, there may well be good reason to force the Dev<->Foundation |
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>>> member assumption. However I think the Dev<->Staff thing should |
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>>> probably be decoupled if one cannot be staff without being a |
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>>> foundation member. |
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>> |
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>> [...] two different pools of voters (Foundation members and |
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>> "Developers" (which today includes anybody with an @g.o address even |
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>> if they don't have commit access - the proposal splits that into Staff |
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>> and Developers) |
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> |
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> |
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> By definition #1, if you're a dev then you're staff; staff is a |
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> superset of dev but there's no separation there based on the |
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> definitions listed. There needs to be a classification for |
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> non-staff-dev if a dev loses foundation membership due to the |
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> staff<->foundation hard coupling and whatever rules there are that |
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> revokes foundation membership and therefore staff status, but can |
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> still remain a dev. |
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> |
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> OR, don't couple dev to staff so that devs have a different (sub)set |
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> of rules regarding foundation membership revocation. |
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> |
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> |
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> |
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>> If we want to rationalize the leadership, we also need to deal with |
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>> their constituencies. |
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>> |
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>> Let's take for example the case of somebody booted as a Dev because of |
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>> some CoC violation. For the sake of simplicity let's assume it was an |
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>> open-and-shut case perfectly handled and Comrel worked in a manner all |
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>> would agree with. Under our current model, they would stop being a |
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>> dev and might be banned from IRC/etc. However, they can still vote |
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>> for Trustees. Does that really make sense? Likewise, if somebody |
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>> leaves due to inactivity but keeps voting in Trustee elections, they |
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>> also can remain part of the Foundation indefinitely. |
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>> |
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>> I'm sure our "alumni" in general care about Gentoo, but the reality is |
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>> that they don't really have much involvement in the day-to-day. Do we |
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>> want them picking our leaders/etc? Today the functions of the |
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>> Trustees are more limited, so it hasn't been as large an issue (though |
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>> as has been pointed out, the legal powers of the Trustees are quite |
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>> large and even if they wisely choose not to exercise them carelessly |
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>> we should certainly exercise care with who we trust in this role). |
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>> However, if we want to expand their powers in practice (setting aside |
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>> whether they already have them legally) then we should probably think |
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>> about who they answer to. Suppose we did come up with a new Comrel |
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>> GLEP and decided to put it up to a general vote for approval; right |
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>> now we need to figure out which of the two groups of constituents to |
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>> poll. |
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>> |
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>> I don't think we need to add a lot of bureaucracy in practice to make |
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>> this work. In general anybody qualified to be a dev is already |
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>> qualified to be a Foundation member, even if we make them apply for it |
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>> currently. While we don't automatically boot people who aren't devs I |
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>> don't see why this would become a problem if the Foundation is |
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>> overseeing the processes by which people leave anyway. |
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>> |
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>> The only real administrative burden it would place on devs is the |
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>> requirements to vote for a Trustee at least once every two years. I'm |
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>> all ears if somebody has a way to make that go away. The practical |
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>> issue here is the need to have a quorum under New Mexico law, so if we |
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>> get low turnout the election may not be valid. While this hasn't come |
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>> up, there is another benefit to making the pool of foundation members |
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>> both large and reasonably active: it makes any kind of "hostile |
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>> takeover" much harder to pull off, while actually making a "good |
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>> takeover" easier. If some kind of outsider wants to infiltrate they |
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>> need to get a quorum to show up to a meeting and control a majority of |
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>> votes there, and that is harder when there are more members required |
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>> to constitute a quorum. On the other hand, if somehow things get out |
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>> of control and the community needs to take things back, then not |
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>> having deadwood in the voting rolls means that those who are actively |
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>> involved would find it easier to constitute a quorum at such a |
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>> meeting. Really, you just want the legal representation of the |
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>> organization to match those who are actively a part of it. |
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>> |
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>> So, the question becomes is compulsory voting a reasonable price to |
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>> pay for better governance. In some (but not many) countries they feel |
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>> strongly enough about such things that they actually fine you for |
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>> failing to vote. |
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>> |
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>> If we just maintain the status quo across the board I can see less |
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>> urgency here. However, if we're going to go so far as to consider |
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>> putting the Trustees at the top of the food chain wouldn't it make |
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>> sense to also take a look at how they get elected? And why would we |
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>> want them maintaining multiple sets of criteria and admission |
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>> processes for the two groups of members they'd now administer? |
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>> |
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>> All that said, this should also demonstrate that "re-organizing" |
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>> Gentoo isn't really just as simple as changing a word in the Wiki |
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>> about where Comrel appeals go. There are a multitude of concerns that |
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>> need to be dealt with. |
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>> |
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> |
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> |
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> OK so my issue is that the proposal as i've read it so far (which to |
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> be fair is only a dozen or so posts in the backlog) seems to say that |
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> the relationship goes the other way around from what you've described |
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> above -- in what you say above it seems that the idea here is to allow |
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> for foundation members to be a subset of dev's but also include staff, |
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> and be more limiting. However it seems to me that devs are a complete |
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> subset of staff in the proposal and therefore any change in foundation |
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> member (and therefore staff) status automatically affects dev status, |
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> or at least that this is an undefined state. |
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> |
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> I don't really have an opinion of what it is that's attempting to be |
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> achieved by the changes (at least, not yet), so long as the text makes |
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> it clear what the classifications are and there isn't any ambiguity |
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> between how a change in state of one classification affects another. |
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> |
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> |
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+1. I think all anyone involved in this discussion wants is clearer, |
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fairer standards for all staff+devs+foundation members. And hopefully, |
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enough introspection to question whether past decisions were correct. |
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|
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-- |
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Daniel Campbell - Gentoo Developer |
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OpenPGP Key: 0x1EA055D6 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net |
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fpr: AE03 9064 AE00 053C 270C 1DE4 6F7A 9091 1EA0 55D6 |