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On Thu, Aug 03, 2017 at 02:18:42PM +0200, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> Dnia 3 sierpnia 2017 13:18:57 CEST, Mike Pagano <mpagano@g.o> napisał(a): |
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> >Hello, |
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> > |
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> >On 08/03/2017 03:06 AM, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> >> On pon, 2017-07-31 at 18:13 -0400, Mike Pagano wrote: |
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> >>> On 07/31/2017 10:15 AM, William Hubbs wrote:> All, |
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> >>>> |
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> >>>> The next Gentoo Council meeting is on Sunday, aug 13 at 18:00 UTC |
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> >in the |
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> >>>> #gentoo-council channel on freenode. |
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> >>>> |
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> >>>> Please reply to this message with any items you would like us to |
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> >discuss |
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> >>>> or vote on. |
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> >>> |
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> >>> <snip> |
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> >>> |
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> >>> I would like to submit the following for the council to discuss and |
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> >vote |
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> >>> upon. |
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> >>> |
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> >>> At the moment, we have a capacity problem around kernel |
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> >stabilization. |
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> >>> Upstream kernels are released at an extremely high rate and the |
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> >Gentoo |
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> >>> Kernel Maintainers do their best to release them shortly thereafter. |
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> >>> |
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> >>> Sometimes, arch teams are not able to respond to stablereqs in a |
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> >timely |
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> >>> manner. This is not a complaint on their efforts, just a description |
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> >of |
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> >>> what happens often for arch teams that are stressed to capacity. |
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> >>> |
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> >>> When the motivation for a STABLEREQ is a high severity security bug |
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> >>> (e.g. root exploit), this delay in stabilization results in us |
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> >having to |
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> >>> keep exploitable kernels in the tree in order not to drop the latest |
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> >>> stable for a specific architecture. |
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> >>> |
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> >>> The procedure outlined below allows for auto-stabilization of minor |
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> >>> bumps by the Gentoo kernel team for any previously stabled major |
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> >version |
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> >>> kernel.[1] |
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> >>> |
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> >>> I welcome discussion, better ideas or anything else that makes |
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> >>> everyone's lives easier and user's systems more secure. |
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> >>> |
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> >> |
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> >> I'm not sure if this is really something for the Council to discuss. |
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> >> Sounds like a regular problem that's best dealt either with arch |
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> >teams |
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> >> directly or on gentoo-dev. |
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> > |
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> >This is really something I would like the Council to discuss and vote |
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> >upon. I've tried to do this through arch teams and the result is root |
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> >exploitable kernels sitting in the tree (which is the state right now |
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> >as |
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> >I write this). Certain architectures will not perform stabilization no |
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> >matter how much I ask. Or how many bugs I submit. Or how many times I |
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> >pop into IRC and ask. And I only do this when I am forced to keep root |
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> >exploits in the tree. |
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> > |
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> > |
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> >> <private hat> |
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> >> |
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> >> I don't mind stabilizing new minor releases automatically but I'd |
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> >prefer |
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> >> if they were at least build-tested with the default config once. |
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> >> However, I doubt anybody's going to shoot you if you take |
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> >> the responsibility for your actions and don't break anything |
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> >important |
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> >> in the process. |
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> >> |
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> >> </private hat> |
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> >> |
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> > |
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> >You're preference would result in the status quo. Exploitable kernels |
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> >sitting in the tree. I don't have the hardware to build and boot test |
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> >on every architecture. |
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> |
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> Well, I meant making the hardware available to you here. This is sth infra and/or arch testers should be able to do. |
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|
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Sorry, my misunderstanding. |
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|
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I would love that. I would need to be able to just install / build and |
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boot. If anyone cares, I have amd64 and x86 at this momment in time. |
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|
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> > |
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> >By only auto stabilizing minor version bumps for which a major bump was |
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> >previously arch tested and stabled, we reduce the risk of breakage. |
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> |
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> |
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> -- |
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> Best regards, |
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> Michał Górny (by phone) |
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> |
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|
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-- |
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Mike Pagano |
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Gentoo Developer - Kernel Project |
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Gentoo Sources - Member |
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E-Mail : mpagano@g.o |
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GnuPG FP : EEE2 601D 0763 B60F 848C 9E14 3C33 C650 B576 E4E3 |
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Public Key : http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?search=0xB576E4E3&op=index |