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On 01/11/2017 06:24 AM, Matthias Maier wrote: |
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> Hi Matthew, |
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> |
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> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017, at 04:59 CST, Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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> [...] |
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> |
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>> I think I'm leaning towards |
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>> the 'board' being what is currently trustees + hr(comrel) + pr + infra. |
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>> Under that would go what is currently being done by council. |
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> |
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> I am a bit astonished by the sudden proposal to centralize more power |
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> under the Gentoo Foundation, A US based non-profit. As was laid out by |
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> ulm and dilfridge, there are a number of severe legal uncertainties for |
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> non-US citizens participating in such a construct and frankly speaking I |
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> do not see the need for it. On the contrary. |
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> |
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|
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I don't necessarily see this as a centralization of power. I think a |
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lot of the debate has been over "Who should 'control' Gentoo" |
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|
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I think that should be the Foundation as the foundation is what |
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currently controls the name of Gentoo and Gentoo's infrastructure and |
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finances. The foundation also has the most legal exposure. Further I'd |
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make the claim that because of the Foundations current status |
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(maintaining legal / financial control of Gentoo), that the Foundation |
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already does, even if the Foundation is very hands off now. |
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|
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As far as the legal uncertainties go, my proposal (the new 1.1 one) |
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makes Foundation membership optional, but it would be opt-out to |
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encourage participation. If there's blowback on the opt-out part then |
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it could be made opt-in, but I'd like to keep participation high if |
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possible. |
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|
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> - It is my firm believe that it is *vital* for an open source project |
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> that essentially consists of volunteers from around the world to be |
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> organized as a community and not as a legal entity under some |
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> jurisdiction. |
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|
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The problem is that we NEED to exist as a legal entity as well. |
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Partially for copyright reasons, but also for tax reasons. If we don't |
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then anyone could register the trademark of 'Gentoo Linux' and then sue |
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us. (not that they can't file frivolous lawsuits anyway). |
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|
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My goal is to move the areas that expose Gentoo legally and financially |
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to be directly under the foundation while keeping the technical matters |
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controlled through Council. This does not preclude having council have |
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things run through them and then to the Foundation, but the foundation |
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should be the final stop in escalations involving legal or financial |
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matters. |
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|
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The way I see it is that Gentoo would basically remain as the status |
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quo, with some slight differences in reporting structure. |
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|
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> |
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> Therefore the status quo makes a lot of sense: |
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> |
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> - the developer community organizing itself |
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> |
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> - the Foundation taking care of legal matters (finances and |
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> infrastructure) that need a legal entity in some jurisdiction |
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> |
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> The vital bit is the fact that the developer community is |
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> self-organizing and this includes the power to decide who is a member |
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> and who is not. |
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> |
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|
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The Foundation has already had to be consulted in one instance about a |
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potential dev from a country for which the US had sanctions against at |
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the time. To me that means that you currently don't have 'ultimate' |
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power to decide who is a dev. No mater where Gentoo is organized I see |
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this being an issue. |
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|
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> - Now, all you essentially propose is to shift the "hr(comrel)" part to |
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> the Foundation - all the rest (trustees, pr, and infra) it is already |
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> in charge of. |
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> |
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> So, why is it important to give the Foundation the power to decide |
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> over the "hr" part of the Gentoo developer community? |
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> |
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> If it is just about comrel, well, we can easily reorganize comrel |
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> into an elected body (by the Gentoo developer community) similarly to |
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> the council. |
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> |
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Being elected is a good decision, but not one my proposal is looking to |
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make. The reason I'd like comrel to operate under the Foundation is |
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legal exposure. I'd suspect that we'd be largely hands off. They could |
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even still escalate to the Council and from Council to the Foundation. |
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> I do not see any necessity for the Foundation to be involved in the |
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> self organization of the developer community. On the contrary, there |
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> is the danger that a strengthened Foundation will severely undermine |
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> the authority of our developer community procedures, with |
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> |
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> - trustees being able to overrule the council on technical and |
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> community decisions |
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> |
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I think/hope this can be prevented with a bylaw prohibiting making |
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technical decisions that don't have impact in legal or financial ways. |
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(prohibiting an ebuild for licensing issues is something we would be |
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able to do, but not prohibiting version a in favor of version b of |
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something like ansible vs chef because we prefer one). |
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> - trustees being able to overrule our (developer) recruiting |
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> process |
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> |
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As I said above, we have already been consulted at least once (it was a |
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while ago) and because of legal exposure I think we have to be. |
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In practice I don't see us doing much other than accepting new devs as |
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they come. Only in extreme circumstances do I see us exercise that power. |
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> So, as a trustee (and the one proposing this move), why do you want to |
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> have this power presiding over the developer community? |
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> |
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Personally, I don't. It's a lot of work and bikeshedding. But I think |
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this will make us better able to handle conflict within the distro |
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(whatever the source or reason). |
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> Best, |
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> Matthias |
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> |
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-- |
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Matthew Thode (prometheanfire) |