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On Wed, 11 Jan 2017 13:08:17 -0600 |
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Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@g.o> wrote: |
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|
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> This proposal sets out a plan to revert to the normal corporate |
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> structure that Gentoo enjoyed before the Foundation and Council were |
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> created. |
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|
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Err, before the Foundation? |
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|
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> Right now this is a general plan for discussion, if we wish to go this |
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> way details need to be hammered out. |
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> |
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> Issues with the status quo: |
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> |
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> Foundation/Trustees exist to take away the burden of running Gentoo |
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> financially, infrastructure and legally. There is some crossover with |
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> projects run under the Council though. PR, Recruitment, Comrel and |
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> Infrastructure exist under the Council, not Foundation. |
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|
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And why is that a problem? I don't see a specific reason for Foundation |
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to get directly involved where Council's doing a good job. |
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|
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> Each of those have implications for Legal reasons (mainly due to how |
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> their actions may expose Gentoo to legal conflict) and monetary reasons |
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> (Infrastructure particularly). |
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|
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As can an action of every individual developer. |
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|
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> Possible Solution: |
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> |
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> Voting body: |
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> |
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> In order to solve this Gentoo needs to have a combined electorate, |
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> meaning those that would vote for Council would also vote for Trustees |
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> and visa-versa. This would ensure that everyone’s needs are represented. |
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> |
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> The combined voting body would be able to opt out of voting, however, |
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> opting out of voting means opting out of voting globally. The reasoning |
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> behind this is so that you can’t opt out of voting for one body but not |
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> the other, as doing so would cause a split in the voting pool. |
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|
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This doesn't answer the most important question of all: who the voting |
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body will be? I doubt people care about being able to opt-out of |
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voting. They do care, however, for being unable to vote for some |
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legal or otherwise external reasons. |
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|
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> Bodies being voted for: |
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> |
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> We should have a single overarching governing body, let’s call it ‘The |
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> Board’. This is so that conflicts between Council and Trustees (as they |
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> exist now) would have a straightforward resolution. |
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> |
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> This new ‘Board’ would be able to use the existing project metastructure |
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> to delegate roles to various groups (Comrel, Infra, etc would still |
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> exist, but under this new Board). Technical leadership would continue |
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> as a sub-project of this board. |
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> |
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> Sub-projects of the board can be voted for by the same electorate that |
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> votes for the board. This does not need to be the case for all |
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> sub-projects. |
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> |
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> It may look something like this: |
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> |
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> Some of the subprojects are for example and may not reflect reality or |
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> be complete, however, the top-level sub-projects should be as is: |
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> |
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> |
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> |
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> |--Council--(various projects) |
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> | |
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> | |--Recruiting |
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> Board --+--Comrel--| |
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> | |--Something else |
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> | |
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> |--PR |
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> | |--Releng (if recognized) |
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> |--Infra--| |
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> |--Portage (possibly) |
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> |
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> Other: |
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> |
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> The Board’s responsibilities should be limited to running to Gentoo as a |
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> global project. This means they’d effectively be trustees. Technical |
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> matters should be limited to the council and its associated |
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> sub-projects. HR type issues should change from appealing up through |
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> the Council (as it is a technical body) to appealing through to the |
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> Board. PR and Infra would be directly managed under the Board. |
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> |
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> This draft of the proposal has nothing to say about the detail of the |
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> formation of the ‘Board’, how many members it would have, nor how they |
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> will be selected. |
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|
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So, this whole thing looks really bad to me. It looks to be based on |
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some (accidental or intentional) misunderstanding what Council is, |
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combined with some degree of conflict of roles in Board (Trustees). |
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|
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As I said previously, the defining attributes of Trustees would be |
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knowledge of the law and related affairs. Why does that suddenly imply |
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that Trustees are required to be capable of handling project |
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leadership? |
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|
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Why do you insist on giving additional power to people who have |
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already have a well-defined purpose? Why are you forcing us to be lead |
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by people who offer to do legal stuff, instead of the people we trust |
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to lead Gentoo? |
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|
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Furthermore, you seem (as many other Foundation power proponents |
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before) to completely miss QA in the picture. For some reason, you all |
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believe Council to be some dumb technical body (which QA is, actually). |
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Post the change, Council and QA would probably be redundant. |
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|
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|
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Therefore, I'd like to propose an another model, which is pretty much |
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what we have now, possibly with some clarifications. |
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|
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For fans of fancy diagrams: |
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|
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Board/Trustees (Foundation) |
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| |
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Council |
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| |
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all other projects in Gentoo |
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|
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|
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As I see it, it's a pretty straightforward and clean structure. We have |
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two organizational bodies: Council and Board/Trustees (I don't really |
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see a reason to rename it). |
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|
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The duty of the Board/Trustees is to handle legal affairs. It is also |
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on the top of organizational structure with the power to override any |
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decision *if it goes against the law / CoC / etc.* In other words, it |
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has the highest power but must use it responsibly, and does not need to |
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be normally engaged in Gentoo affairs. |
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|
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The duty of the Council is to handle all affairs within Gentoo. All |
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projects are below Council, and Council is the final 'normal' appeal |
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for all decisions. Unlike some beliefs, its role is not limited to |
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technical matters. |
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|
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This provides a good split of responsibilities for a non-profit. On one |
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hand, we have a 'compliance board' (== Board/Trustees) that handles |
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the legal affairs but doesn't get in the way of the distribution unless |
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it is absolutely necessary, and we have an 'executive board' (== |
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Council) that handles the distribution. |
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|
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Obviously, this also meets the necessity of different qualities. Board |
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members/Trustees need to be fluent in the laws and/or finances. Council |
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members need social skills mostly, and possibly some technical skills |
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to be able to interact with the community. We no longer give extra |
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power to someone just because nobody else wants to do the legal work. |
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|
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I don't see why would anybody claim this not to be a normal or |
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beneficial structure. It is definitely more clear than what you're |
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proposing, and definitely less likely for conflicts of interest. It |
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provides a consistent decision appeal possibility, with a dedicated |
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body to handle appeals regarding CoC/law. |
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|
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |
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<http://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/> |