Gentoo Archives: gentoo-project

From: Alexis Ballier <aballier@g.o>
To: gentoo-project@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-project] [RFC] New project: GURU [Gentoo User Repository, Unreviewed]
Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2019 14:04:57
Message-Id: 20190204150448.0af917bf@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-project] [RFC] New project: GURU [Gentoo User Repository, Unreviewed] by "Michał Górny"
On Mon, 04 Feb 2019 14:54:40 +0100
Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote:

> On Mon, 2019-02-04 at 14:48 +0100, Alexis Ballier wrote: > > On Mon, 04 Feb 2019 14:28:28 +0100 > > Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: > > > > > On Mon, 2019-02-04 at 11:58 +0100, Alexis Ballier wrote: > > > > On Sun, 03 Feb 2019 20:28:49 +0100 > > > > Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: > > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > What do you think? > > > > > > > > > > > > > What is the difference with sunrise ? > > > > > > The difference, as noted in the mail, is that it doesn't rely > > > on developers having time to review ebuilds. Therefore, it is > > > less likely to die because of developers lacking time to review > > > stuff. > > > > > > Then I fear you will see the same pitfalls, and it already started: > > I recall sunrise haters being very strongly against the idea > > because, TBH, our sandboxing mechanism isn't a real sandbox. It may > > have improved, but I doubt it's up to the point that we can safely > > run untrusted code there. > > Sandboxing has nothing to do with security, and trying to 'improve' > its security is a waste of time. What's the point of preventing > ebuilds from doing malicious things at build time if they can install > files that do malicious things afterwards?
Because one may or may not run a malicious binary. You are more likely to install it. And even more likely to source the ebuild.

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