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On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 5:13 PM, wabe <wabenbau@×××××.com> wrote: |
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> Ian Zimmerman <itz@×××××××.net> wrote: |
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> |
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>> On 2017-01-07 17:36, wabe wrote: |
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>> |
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>> > I think a dedicated (virtual) machine for online banking is |
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>> > much more important than the use of a specific browser. |
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>> |
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>> This sounds like a very good idea, but are there unintended |
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>> consequences? For example, where do you keep the password? |
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> |
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> In my little red analog notebook. :-) |
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> If someone steal it, is is useless without my banking card that |
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> I always carry with me when I leave the house. Without this |
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> card the thief cannot crate TANs (I'm using a TAN generator |
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> that only works with my card). |
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> |
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If you actually do use a dedicated machine I'd probably encrypt the |
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whole thing, using many rounds (which makes cracking the password |
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prohibitive, LUKS probably does that by default). |
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Then you could actually use whatever browser you want inside (even |
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IE), and just have the password managed any way you want inside as |
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long as it is strong (browser PW manager, lastpass, whatever). Since |
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you ONLY visit the bank website using the VM then the only way for |
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somebody to get at your vault would be to hack the bank website, and |
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if they're going to do that you're hosed no matter what. A dedicated |
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machine would be safer since you're less vulnerable to attacks on the |
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host (which they could use to keyboard sniff your VM password, or your |
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bank password if you key that in manually). |
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This is why I commented that if you're really concerned with security |
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a VM or dedicated host around the browser used to only access the bank |
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website is probably going to provide a lot more security than trying |
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to pick the "right" multi-site browser. By having a dedicated VM and |
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browser for one site you're immune to cross-site attacks, sandbox |
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vulnerabilities, etc. With a VM you have the VM's ability to sandbox, |
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but that is the main purpose of a VM, and with a dedicated host then |
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you're down to remote exploits of the host itself, which need not run |
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any listening ports and it could be behind a firewall. |
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If you're going to install a special browser only for banking you're |
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probably better off going the VM route (or more, possibly run from its |
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own UID). It seems equivalent in terms of hassle but it is probably |
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much more secure. |
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-- |
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Rich |
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