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"Jason Rivard" <jase.rivard@×××××.com> at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 23:53:23 |
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> > > The only thing that cryptography attempts to do is reduce the |
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> > > **probability** of cracking the key and gaining access to the data as |
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> > > low as possible. |
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> > |
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> > No news. That's, why cryptology defines "security" not as "being |
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> > impossible |
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> > to crack", but as "being sufficiently improbable to crack". The only |
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> > cipher, that can't be "brute-forced", is the OTP, which is |
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> > considered "perfectly secure". |
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> |
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> There is no such thing as perfectly secure, |
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|
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A OTP cannot be broken using brute force, so the term "perfectly secure" |
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fits here, imho, at least a bit ;) |
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> > In such a case, the question is, if the data, you ciphered, is really |
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> > worth the effort of putting a super computer into work for a long time |
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> > to try any possible passphrase. |
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> |
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> Mr. Walters' claim is not that they would put a single super-computer to |
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> decrypting it, but a "network of supercomputers". |
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|
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Does that difference really matter for ciphers like AES or at least for |
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brute-force attacks on random 256-bit keys? |
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|
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> I truly don't think you |
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> have to worry about that occurring, unless you are deemed a danger to US |
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> National Security. Even then, AES is very hard to crack. The major |
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> weakness is the person who encrypts the data. Under questioning, most |
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> will give up their keys. |
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> |
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> > > Cryptology is, at least partly about finding the weakest link, |
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> > > because that is what is likely to be attacked in any cryptosystem. |
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> > |
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> > Of course, absolutely true. Hard disk encryption is by far not |
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> > perfect, just look at the cold boot attacks that gained public interest |
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> > in the last time. But you didn't talk of _cryptosystems_ in your |
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> > previous posts, you did talk about _algorithms_. |
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> |
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> By themselves algorithms are relatively useless. It is only the |
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> application of those algorithms that make them useful. |
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|
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Still, there is a difference between the algorithm as such and a |
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cryptosystem applying this algorithm. |
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|
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Btw, apart from general stuff like weak passphrases, that apply to most |
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cryptosystems, really bad leaks often came from weak algorithms. Consider |
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WEP. |
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|
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> > > A final thought: It is a fact that both the US Navy and the NSA are |
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> > > *very* interested in cryptology and data security. The NSA also does |
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> > > have large networks of supercomputers that, using parallel, |
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> > > distributed or concurrent computing principles can crack keys more |
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> > > quickly than you may think. |
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> > |
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> > You can use simple mathematics to find out, that even the largest super |
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> > computers, having one peta flop, needs millions of years to perform an |
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> > exhaustive search through AES key space. |
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> > |
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> > Anyway, you may believe, what you want to believe, I'm just reflecting, |
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> > what |
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> > real experts like Bruce Schneier have been telling for years: It's |
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> > wrong to trust into simple ciphers, but it's equally wrong, to believe, |
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> > that anything can be broken. |
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> |
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> It is equally wrong to believe that any cipher is immune to attack |
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|
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I don't and I did not say so, things like the Debian disaster bring you back |
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to reality from dreams ... |
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-- |
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Freedom is always the freedom of dissenters. |
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(Rosa Luxemburg) |