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On Monday, September 07, 2015 7:02:45 PM wabenbau@×××××.com wrote: |
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> Fernando Rodriguez <frodriguez.developer@×××××××.com> wrote: |
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> |
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> > On Sunday, September 06, 2015 1:15:17 PM walt wrote: |
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> > > https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened_Gentoo |
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> > > |
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> > > That wiki page is very seductive. It makes me want to drop |
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> > > everything and select a hardened profile and re-emerge everything |
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> > > from scratch. |
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> > > |
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> > > But I have a feeling I'd soon be in big trouble if I did. Is this |
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> > > something that only gentoo devs should be messing with, or is this |
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> > > a project that a typical gentoo end-user might hope to accomplish |
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> > > without frequent suicidal thoughts? |
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> > |
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> > There's different opinions on it, but mine is that while it adds some |
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> > security it's so little that it's not worth it in most cases. It |
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> > provides more security on a binary distro because everyone has the |
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> > same binaries and an attacker don't need to guess where a specific |
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> > piece of code may get loaded but by running a source distro your |
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> > address space is already pretty unique. The only case where it |
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> > provides some security is when an attacker is trying to guess an |
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> > address for an exploit, making the wrong guess will likely crash the |
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> > process and it will be reloaded on a new address. Do you have |
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> > valuable enough data for an attacker to go through that hassle in |
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> > order to get it? If you do then you should use a hardened profile, |
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> > but physical security and disk encryption is more important because |
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> > if it's worth that much it'll be easier to just rob you. |
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> |
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> I'm not a security expert, so I'm maybe wrong here, But I think there |
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> are more security functions on gentoo-hardened than just address space |
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> randomization. There are also things like stack smash protection and |
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> some other restrictions that make it harder to exploit security holes. |
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|
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AFAIU about everything else you get is better defaults, nothing you can't do |
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yourself through CFLAGS, etc. SSP for example is enabled by default on recent |
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GCC versions as mentioned by Michael. It will make some exploits harder but |
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IMO not enough to be worth it for the average user. |
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-- |
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Fernando Rodriguez |