Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: BRM <bm_witness@×××××.com>
To: "gentoo-user@l.g.o" <gentoo-user@l.g.o>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] Lockdown: free/open OS maker pays Microsoft ransom for the right to boot on users' computers
Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 13:37:24
Message-Id: 1338816810.91572.YahooMailNeo@web39302.mail.mud.yahoo.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-user] Lockdown: free/open OS maker pays Microsoft ransom for the right to boot on users' computers by Michael Mol
1 > From: Michael Mol <mikemol@×××××.com>
2
3 >On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 10:04 PM, BRM <bm_witness@×××××.com> wrote:
4 >>> From: Michael Mol <mikemol@×××××.com>
5 >[snip]
6 >> In theory that's how key signing systems are suppose to work.
7 >> In practice, they rarely implement the blacklists as they are (i) hard to maintain,
8 >> and (ii) hard to distribute in an effective manner.
9 >
10 >Indeed. While Firefox, Chromium, et al check certificate revocation
11 >lists, Microsoft doesn't; they distribute them as part of Windows
12 >Update.
13
14
15 Which can then be intercepted by IT in any IT department that stages Windows Update using their own servers.
16
17
18 >> Honestly, I don't expect SecureBoot to last very long.
19 >> Either MS and the OEMs will be forced to always allow users to disable it,
20 >> or they'll be simply drop it - kind of like they did with TPM requirements that were
21 >> talked about 10 years back and never came to fruition.
22 >
23 >TPM is still around for organizations which can use them. And,
24 >honestly, I've been annoyed that they haven't been widespread, nor
25 >easy to pick up in the aftermarket. (They come with a random number
26 >generator...just about any HRNG is going to be better than none.)
27
28
29 Yes TPM (originally named Palladium) is still around. However its use is almost non-existent.
30 When it was proposed, it was to include "SecureBoot" and enable secure Internet transactions, etc.
31 None of that came to fruition. Now, after over a decade of ignoring it, they are trying it one step at a time, first with SecureBoot.
32
33
34 >I see something like SecureBoot as being useful in corporate and
35 >military security contexts. I don't see it lasting in SOHO
36 >environments.
37
38
39 Certain environments as you say may find it useful; but then those environments already have very stringent controls
40 over the computers in those environments, often to the inability of people to do their job.
41
42
43 >[snip]
44 >>> What kind of signature is the bootloader checking, anyway?
45 >> Regardless of the check, it'll never be sufficient.
46 >Sure; ultimately, all DRM solutions get cracked.
47
48
49 TPM and SecureBoot will by design fail.
50 We'll see if SecureBoot actually even makes it to market; if it does, expect some Class Action lawsuits to occur.
51
52 Ben

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