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On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 10:04 PM, BRM <bm_witness@×××××.com> wrote: |
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>> From: Michael Mol <mikemol@×××××.com> |
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> |
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[snip] |
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> |
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> In theory that's how key signing systems are suppose to work. |
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> In practice, they rarely implement the blacklists as they are (i) hard to maintain, |
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> and (ii) hard to distribute in an effective manner. |
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Indeed. While Firefox, Chromium, et al check certificate revocation |
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lists, Microsoft doesn't; they distribute them as part of Windows |
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Update. |
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> |
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> Honestly, I don't expect SecureBoot to last very long. |
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> Either MS and the OEMs will be forced to always allow users to disable it, |
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> or they'll be simply drop it - kind of like they did with TPM requirements that were |
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> talked about 10 years back and never came to fruition. |
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TPM is still around for organizations which can use them. And, |
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honestly, I've been annoyed that they haven't been widespread, nor |
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easy to pick up in the aftermarket. (They come with a random number |
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generator...just about any HRNG is going to be better than none.) |
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I see something like SecureBoot as being useful in corporate and |
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military security contexts. I don't see it lasting in SOHO |
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environments. |
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[snip] |
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>> What kind of signature is the bootloader checking, anyway? |
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> |
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> Regardless of the check, it'll never be sufficient. |
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Sure; ultimately, all DRM solutions get cracked. |
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-- |
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:wq |
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