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On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 03:30:07PM -0400, Rich Freeman wrote |
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> With TPM, full-disk encryption, and a verified boot path, you could |
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> actually protect against that scenario (they'd have to tear apart the |
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> TPM chip and try to access the non-volatile storage directly, and the |
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> chips are specifically designed to defeat this). Secure boot would |
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> not hurt either (with your own keys). Of course, they could still try |
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> to hack in via USB/PCI/etc, or plant keyloggers and such. I'm not |
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> suggesting physical security isn't important. It just isn't a good |
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> reason to completely neglect console security. |
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Be careful what you wish for. I have my doubts that TPM chips would |
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boot linux with Microsoft offering "volume discounts" to OEMS. Call me |
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cynical. |
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-- |
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Walter Dnes <waltdnes@××××××××.org> |
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I don't run "desktop environments"; I run useful applications |
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