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On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 7:20 PM, Walter Dnes <waltdnes@××××××××.org> wrote: |
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> On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 12:43:12PM +0200, lee wrote |
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> |
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>> That leaves the question why a user who isn't even logged in should |
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>> be able to reboot, which IIRC they can by default with Ctrl+Alt+Del. |
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>> Such users shouldn't be allowed to do anything but to log in. |
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> |
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> As the old saying goes... "If you don't have physical security, you |
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> don't have any security". A malicious person at the physical keyboard |
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> of the machine could just as easily yank the power cord of out of the |
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> wall, insert a USB key into the machine, plug the machine back in, boot |
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> up from the USB key, and copy over malicious binaries. |
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> |
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|
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With TPM, full-disk encryption, and a verified boot path, you could |
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actually protect against that scenario (they'd have to tear apart the |
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TPM chip and try to access the non-volatile storage directly, and the |
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chips are specifically designed to defeat this). Secure boot would |
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not hurt either (with your own keys). Of course, they could still try |
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to hack in via USB/PCI/etc, or plant keyloggers and such. I'm not |
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suggesting physical security isn't important. It just isn't a good |
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reason to completely neglect console security. |
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-- |
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Rich |