1 |
On Sun, Feb 26, 2017 at 5:00 AM, Miroslav Rovis |
2 |
<miro.rovis@××××××××××××××.hr> wrote: |
3 |
> On 170225-21:34-0600, R0b0t1 wrote: |
4 |
>> On Saturday, February 25, 2017, Miroslav Rovis <miro.rovis@××××××××××××××.hr> |
5 |
>> wrote: |
6 |
>> > |
7 |
>> https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html |
8 |
> ... |
9 |
>> |
10 |
>> Very interesting. The first useful SHA-1 collision was, if I remember, done |
11 |
>> in 2015, and subverted an HTTPS certificate (though not one which had been |
12 |
>> issued). This was some guys with a couple of servers lined with graphics |
13 |
>> cards. |
14 |
>> |
15 |
>> Seeing someone manage to do it in a garage a number of years before it was |
16 |
>> cosidered feasible should, hopefully, make you have more conservative |
17 |
>> estimates of the strength of modern cryptography. |
18 |
>> |
19 |
>> Aside: |
20 |
>> http://ecrypt-eu.blogspot.com/2015/11/break-dozen-secret-keys-get-million.html |
21 |
> |
22 |
> Too technical for me. Too little learning gain for too much mumbo-jumbo noise, at this |
23 |
> stage of my understanding of crypto, for me. |
24 |
> |
25 |
|
26 |
My apologies. The useful part of the link is really the title. It |
27 |
explains how, if you *do* successfully break a given key, you have |
28 |
necessarily broken millions of them - you are just unsure if they are |
29 |
currently in use. The wise option is then to record every key |
30 |
combination you brute force in the hope that someone will start using |
31 |
it in the future. |
32 |
|
33 |
>> R0b0t1. |
34 |
> |
35 |
> But, when we talk crypto being broken, I can help thinking of other |
36 |
> threats to Gentoo and other FOSS GNU Linux that I fear are perfectly |
37 |
> feasible (for the resourceful subjects) |
38 |
> |
39 |
> Gentoo distro is increasingly served the insecure way, IMO, that is: via |
40 |
> git, without the repositories being, for end users, PGP-verifiable. |
41 |
> |
42 |
> And via a new private big business, the Github. Giving over all users to |
43 |
> big Github brother. |
44 |
> |
45 |
> And, in the trasition all the history got lost. Git started remembering |
46 |
> only from 2015. |
47 |
> |
48 |
> I have asked a question about getting git-served repository verifiable |
49 |
> for end users, but I didn't get any replies: |
50 |
> |
51 |
|
52 |
This is something I was concerned about myself, especially since the |
53 |
bare git protocol that most users access the repository from, even if |
54 |
it is the repository hosted by the Gentoo Foundation, is insecure. Git |
55 |
access via SSH or HTTPS *is* secure but is not implemented - I'm not |
56 |
sure why, as they've purchased a "real" certificate and the Git |
57 |
subdomain may already be covered by it. |
58 |
|
59 |
> - |
60 |
> Miroslav Rovis |
61 |
> Zagreb, Croatia |
62 |
> https://www.CroatiaFidelis.hr |
63 |
|
64 |
Well, maybe someone will noticed this message. Or not. |
65 |
|
66 |
R0b0t1. |