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On Thursday 25 Dec 2014 08:43:23 Bill Kenworthy wrote: |
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> On 25/12/14 15:43, Joseph wrote: |
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> > I've installed "zoiper" (this is an softphone app to connect to my |
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> > Asterisk server) on my old phone and it works on my private network over |
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> > wifi. |
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> > I'm using standard IAX port 4569 to register, so this port is open on my |
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> > firewall. |
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> > |
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> > But when I catch an open public wifi network in a Mall or a Tim Horton |
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> > "zoiper" failed to register. |
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> > |
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> > Do they block outgoing ports of public WiFi networks? What are my |
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> > alternatives? |
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> > |
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> > I can open any port on my DD-Wrt and redirect it to my Asterisk server. |
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> |
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> Quite often happens in this part of the world. I run an openvpn ssl vpn |
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> on port 443 with an ssl multiplexor on the server end - route all the |
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> voip traffic through the vpn. Doesnt work well if bandwidth is really |
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> constrained but its the difference between having at least something or |
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> nothing at all. |
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> |
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> BillK |
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|
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Most public WiFi hot spots in Europe, especially in multinational coffee shop |
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chains, not only block privileged ports to thwart SOCK proxies, ssh, ipsec, et |
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al., but also use deep-packet inspection and Man-In-The-Middle attack to |
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decrypt your TLS connection to http, https, IMAP4, and POP3 and check your |
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payload. They do this to make sure that you are not some unsavoury character, |
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using their Internet connection for questionable activities. A number of |
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companies (like Websense) offer this kind of helpful services to those who |
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need to spy on our private communications. |
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|
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If you check the SSL certificate that is returned from e.g. gmail, you'll see |
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that it has not been issued by gmail, or their CA. Most client applications |
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should warn you when you try to connect to a website over TLS. In such cases |
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I would consider your communications over this channel compromised, should you |
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decide to proceed. |
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|
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-- |
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Regards, |
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Mick |