Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Marius Mauch <genone@g.o>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Key policy for GPG verification [was: 2004.2 Feature Requests]
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2004 20:23:52
Message-Id: 20040430222338.327af167@sven.genone.homeip.net
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] 2004.2 Feature Requests by John Davis
1 On 04/30/04 John Davis wrote:
2
3 > Portage enhancements are a tough one. I know that genone has emerge
4 > security almost there and GPG manifest signing is somewhere in the
5 > middle (need verification here). The problem in making these release
6 > guidelines is the fact that they are totally dependent on 2 people's
7 > time and work. Releng does not have control over whether or not these
8 > can be completed, so putting them on the feature list usually ends up
9 > being an exercise in futility. If some people are willing to help out
10 > carpaski and genone, then I will add it to the list, but if they are
11 > left implementing and testing these two rather substantial features
12 > themselves, I am not adding them to the list.
13
14 Ok, guess I should repeat that the most important thing for GPG signing
15 (actually the missing part is verification) that's still missing is a
16 key policy: where to store keys, how to check if they are trustworthy
17 and so on. If we can agree on a simple and effective solution there it
18 shouldn't be too difficult to implement this feature (talking about code
19 here, not the tree). The last time we had a way too long thread with way
20 too many details and discussions about problem scenarios, please let's
21 try to avoid that.
22 And to get everyone on track I'll start with a very simple proposal
23 (idea stolen from Spanky IIRC), I won't say that it's really effective
24 though:
25 - keys are stored in a keyring and are installed by an ebuild
26 - a key is trustworthy if it is in that keyring
27 - expiration is handled by removing the key from that keyring
28 - each modification to the keyring involves a version bump on the ebuild
29 That's about the easiest for implementation and doesn't require anything
30 new for our infrastructure or key-signing-sessions. It does not say who
31 will manage that keyring though as that is not important for the
32 implementation. I'm pretty sure that the idea has a number of flaws, but
33 we have to start somewhere.
34
35 Marius
36
37 --
38 Public Key at http://www.genone.de/info/gpg-key.pub
39
40 In the beginning, there was nothing. And God said, 'Let there be
41 Light.' And there was still nothing, but you could see a bit better.

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] Key policy for GPG verification [was: 2004.2 Feature Requests] Chris Bainbridge <C.J.Bainbridge@×××××.uk>