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On Sun, 2003-09-07 at 21:55, Jan Krueger wrote: |
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> So does fixing the security holes in portage. We have identified 2 big ones so |
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> far: |
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> 1. functions like pkg_postinst |
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> 2. easy to compromise bash scripts |
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> and another one is already well known: |
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> 3. the centralized portage tree |
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> |
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> That leads me to the conclusions: |
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> portage is unsecure by design |
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> |
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> Please (the one responsible for it) clearify the statement: |
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> "Thanks to a technology called Portage, Gentoo Linux can become an ideal |
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> secure server" in http://www.gentoo.org/main/en/about.xml |
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> |
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> I have to remove gentoo from my servers a little bit faster it seems... |
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> |
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Ok, but .rpm/.deb have the same kind of flaws ... From here on I can |
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only see that you can use LFS or such, that you can make sure everything |
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is ok. |
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PS: How are you going to verify that gcc's cvs repo was not |
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compromised? Or the kernel's ? I guess you are going to |
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start coding you own kernel, tool-chain and the rest even |
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sooner now that we know how flawed linux, gnuish apps, etc |
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are. |
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-- |
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Martin Schlemmer |
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Gentoo Linux Developer, Desktop/System Team Developer |
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Cape Town, South Africa |
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