1 |
On Sunday 07 September 2003 17:39, Thomas de Grenier de Latour wrote: |
2 |
> On Sun, 7 Sep 2003 19:07:03 +0000 |
3 |
> |
4 |
> Jan Krueger <jk@×××××××××××.net> wrote: |
5 |
> > The notable difference is: |
6 |
> > /usr/sbin/foo is not executed automaticly while emerge. |
7 |
> |
8 |
> You lack imagination: the bash scripts used by emerge are just |
9 |
> as easy to corrupt using a src_install only ebuild. |
10 |
|
11 |
So this clearly is a bug that must be fixed. |
12 |
|
13 |
> > On the other hand i try discuss on g-hardened how to detect malicious |
14 |
> > code. |
15 |
> |
16 |
> Cryptographic signature as suggested by avenj would be a much more |
17 |
> realistic approach here. Since I do my phd in the security-oriented |
18 |
> program analysis domain, it breaks my heart to say that, but it's a |
19 |
> fact. |
20 |
|
21 |
but even cryptographic signatures got compromised (by faulty algorithms, users |
22 |
handling the keys unappropriate, ..., and even gentoo-core [supposed to |
23 |
handle the keys] is made out of humans and humans do make mistakes) So |
24 |
cryptographics signatures alone are not the holy grail as isnt |
25 |
security-oriented program analysis. But each one of them raises the bar a |
26 |
little bit, and both of them a little bit more :) |
27 |
|
28 |
So does fixing the security holes in portage. We have identified 2 big ones so |
29 |
far: |
30 |
1. functions like pkg_postinst |
31 |
2. easy to compromise bash scripts |
32 |
and another one is already well known: |
33 |
3. the centralized portage tree |
34 |
|
35 |
That leads me to the conclusions: |
36 |
portage is unsecure by design |
37 |
|
38 |
Please (the one responsible for it) clearify the statement: |
39 |
"Thanks to a technology called Portage, Gentoo Linux can become an ideal |
40 |
secure server" in http://www.gentoo.org/main/en/about.xml |
41 |
|
42 |
I have to remove gentoo from my servers a little bit faster it seems... |
43 |
|
44 |
Jan |
45 |
|
46 |
|
47 |
-- |
48 |
gentoo-dev@g.o mailing list |