Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Alec Warner <antarus@g.o>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@g.o>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: rejecting unsigned commits
Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2011 02:39:26
Message-Id: AANLkTikrHbFGvgDwh-r4YqGiBEX7sKOSh0VRwb_zx3jJ@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: rejecting unsigned commits by Mike Frysinger
1 On Fri, Mar 25, 2011 at 7:28 PM, Mike Frysinger <vapier@g.o> wrote:
2 > On Fri, Mar 25, 2011 at 2:57 PM, Dane Smith wrote:
3 >> On 03/25/2011 02:46 PM, Mike Frysinger wrote:
4 >>> On Fri, Mar 25, 2011 at 4:53 AM, Andreas K. Huettel wrote:
5 >>>> Of course now we can add additional requirements:
6 >>>>
7 >>>> * The key must have an userid that refers to an official Gentoo e-mail
8 >>>> address. E.g. dilfridge@g.o
9 >>>
10 >>> no.  there's no reason for this requirement, and it prevents proxy
11 >>> maintenance long term.  e-mail addresses do not verify identity,
12 >>> verifying identify verifies identity.  this is the point of the web of
13 >>> trust.
14 >>
15 >> We are somewhat limited in the amount that we can verify "identity."
16 >> Sure you can get a decent web of trust from signing the keys of people
17 >> you've met at conferences, however, there will be people outside of that
18 >> web.
19 >
20 > creating one "tree key" which signs all developer keys listed in LDAP
21 > is trivial to do
22 >
23 >> What we need to verify is rather that the person who made the
24 >> commit is someone who is authorized to make the commit and that it was
25 >> in no way tampered with.
26 >
27 > you're validating only that the machine with access to the private
28 > keys pushed up the commit.  hopefully the only person with said
29 > machine is the one we recruited.
30 > -mike
31 >
32 >
33
34 Coming back around to the earlier discussion of Alice who has her key
35 signed by robbat2 (because he loves keysigning parties) and then Alice
36 breaks into cvs.gentoo.org and commits evil code into the tree. If we
37 cannot stop this attack because we are relying on a chain of trust
38 (and Alice is in the chain) can we at least detect the attack?
39
40 As it appears to me; I am much more likely to somehow manipulate the
41 chain in trust in an incorrect way (such as at a keysigning hibjib) as
42 opposed to adding some random strangers key to a master list on
43 dev.gentoo.org or in LDAP. The former action is essentially an
44 innocent act with non-obvious (to me) repercussions and the latter is
45 an act with really only one intent.
46
47 I don't care about GPG at all. I hate it. I don't want to know how
48 it works and I don't want developers who are in the same boat as me to
49 fuck it up because they don't know what they are doing. I don't have
50 commit-bit to gentoo-x86 so I don't have a big stake in this ;)

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: rejecting unsigned commits Mike Frysinger <vapier@g.o>