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On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand <k_f@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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>> |
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>> 2. The question is why manifests are modified for rsync. In git |
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>> manifests are thin (only distfiles are there), in rsync they also |
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>> contain checksums for ebuilds and files dir content. Do we really |
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>> need this? These manifests are not signed now, so of little use. |
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> |
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> They will be OpenPGP signed by a releng key during thickening and |
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> portage will auto-verify it using gkeys once things are in place. As |
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> such checksum for ebuilds and other files certainly needs to be part |
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> of the manifest, otherwise it can open up for malicious alterations of |
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> these files. |
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> |
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As much as I'd love to see it all folded into git, the reality is also |
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that git signatures are only bound to files by a series of sha1 |
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hashes, and sha1 is not a strong hash function. Git really ought to |
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move to sha256 at some point, preferably in a manner that makes it |
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expandable in the future to other hash functions. But, this isn't a |
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high-priority for upstream. |
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The same limitation is true of any git gpg signature, including tag |
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signatures. It is all held together by sha1. The manifest system is |
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much stronger. |
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|
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-- |
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Rich |
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