Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: William Kenworthy <billk@×××××××××.au>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] zoom concerns
Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 02:13:26
Message-Id: b297f9b3-6ff7-3d9a-4804-a067c66a83a8@iinet.net.au
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] zoom concerns by Alec Warner
1 And I would like to add that sometimes you don't have a choice - if
2 someone who is paying you says to use zoom, there is no choice - but I
3 would rather use gentoo than fire up the MS laptop..
4
5 What gentoo can do is mitigate the risk - which I need to look into to
6 see whats done in the ebuild over a default install of their binary..
7
8
9 William K.
10
11
12 On 2/4/20 8:53 am, Alec Warner wrote:
13 > On Wed, Apr 1, 2020 at 5:18 PM Alessandro Barbieri
14 > <lssndrbarbieri@×××××.com <mailto:lssndrbarbieri@×××××.com>> wrote:
15 >
16 > I have concerns about the inclusion of zoom in ::gentoo. For me
17 > it's more like a malware.
18 > From the hacker news feed you'll find out that:
19 >
20 >
21 > [1] zero day vulnerability found
22 >
23 > [2] passwords are truncated to 32 bit
24 >
25 > [3] previously sent data to facebook
26 >
27 > [4] end to end traffic isn't encrypted
28 > [5] signed binary run unsigned script
29 >
30 >
31 > [1], [2], [5] all seem like bugs and I'd expect upstream to fix at
32 > least [1] and [5].  Note that in Gentoo [3] isn't directly relevant
33 > (this isn't iOS) and neither is [5] in most cases as people don't run
34 > signed binaries or use any kind of binary whitelisting in Gentoo.
35 >
36 > [2] I think the article mentions the truncation is to 32 bytes (or '32
37 > chars', but I assume each char is 1 byte for entropy sake.); not 32
38 > bits. Most password fields have a length limit (you cannot accept
39 > arbitrary long passwords. If 32 characters isn't enough length to
40 > protect users then the passwords are going to be useless anyway; most
41 > user passwords are significantly less than 32 characters. This is
42 > significantly different than limited to '32 bits' (which is 4
43 > characters!) and would make brute forcing passwords an obvious breeze;
44 > there is not sufficient entropy in 32 bits to protect users.
45 >
46 > [4] I agree the poor marketing is a problem. I think as Rich states
47 > later in the thread it's possible we could provide more information
48 > here. As he notes though, I'm not convinced this is reason not to
49 > package the software in Gentoo from a policy perspective.
50 >
51 > In general I expect that as long as Zoom has a gentoo maintainer and
52 > upstream actually resolves outstanding security issues; I'm not really
53 > aware of any policy hurdles they need to overcome to stay packaged in
54 > Gentoo. Currently it has three maintainers[6]. If it sucks, convince
55 > them to stop maintaining it ;)
56 >
57 > -A
58 >
59 > 1 https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/01/zoom-doom/?guccounter=1
60 > 2 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22749706
61 > 3
62 > https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/z3b745/zoom-removes-code-that-sends-data-to-facebook
63 > 4 https://theintercept.com/2020/03/31/zoom-meeting-encryption/
64 > 5 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22746764
65 >
66 >
67 > [6] https://packages.gentoo.org/packages/net-im/zoom

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] zoom concerns "Michał Górny" <mgorny@g.o>