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On 22 Aug 2012 at 1:37, Maxim Kammerer wrote: |
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> On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 11:44 PM, Anthony G. Basile |
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> <basile@××××××××××××××.edu> wrote: |
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> > That sounds about right. I'm not hitting this with tor-ramdisk, a tiny |
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> > ramdisk image for running tor relays, built with latest tor + busybox + |
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> > hardened kernel. I have PAX_SIZE_OVERFLOW off. I didn't even try turning |
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> > it on since its still very experimental. |
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it's actually getting better, since last week's version the number of |
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false positives should be much reduced. |
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> Perhaps the Kconfig description should be more explicit about the |
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> status of this feature (looking at one in 3.4.7 sources now)? When |
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> upgrading to 3.4 hardened-source series, I suspected that this feature |
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> was rather experimental, but couldn't confirm it even after some |
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> thorough searching, so I figured out (maybe wrongly) that it was a |
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> mature work that grsecurity / PaX finally decided to include in their |
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> patches. |
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did your thorough search include the grsec mailing list archives? if |
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you google '"size_overflow" pax' then it's like the first hit there ;). |
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